



Abraham C. Dunn 
2006 
The Dissertation Committee for Abraham C. Dunn    
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
Three Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization 
Committee: 






Three Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization 
by 
Abraham C. Dunn, B.S.; M.S.Eco. 
Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The University of Texas at Austin 
December 2006
iv 
I dedicate this dissertation to my family. To my parents Margaret and Allan 
for providing strong support from the beginning and never losing the faith in me. To 
my brother Aaron for helping me keep things down-to-earth and in perspective, and 
to my brother Nathan who, through all our long conversations, has been particularly 
understanding since he is also completing his dissertation. 
I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to Ed Whitelaw for spurring 
my interest in economics and getting me started. 
v 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank all of my committee members. I am especially indebted 
to my supervisor Ken Hendricks for his helpful feedback on this dissertation. I 
found discussions with Ken on a variety of topics, even economic topics unrelated to 
this dissertation, to be invaluable and helped me maintain intellectual enthusiasm 
throughout the process. I would also like to offer special thanks to Randal Watson 
who was always willing to talk, read papers and offer insightful comments despite 
his busy schedule. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my friends Martha Martinez-Licetti 
and Brett Wendling for both substantive comments and personal encouragement. 
ABRAHAM C. DUNN 
The University of Texas at Austin 
2006 
vi 
Three Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization 
Publication No. 
Abraham C. Dunn, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2006 
Supervisor: Kenneth Hendricks 
There are many differentiated product industries in which firms offer multiple 
products in the same market. In making strategic decisions regarding entry, quality 
and quantity to be supplied for their multiple products firms must consider the com- 
petition with rivals as well as cannibalization of their own products that are close 
substitutes. In this setting, understanding the relationship between the behavior of 
consumer demand and firms decisions' regarding product characteristics and strate- 
gic variables like advertising are fundamental issues in industrial organization. This 
dissertation empirically explores these fundamental issues in the pharmaceutical and 
airline industries. 
The first paper of my dissertation estimates consumer demand for different 
anti-cholesterol drugs using panel data on a nationally representative sample of 
individuals who were diagnosed with cholesterol problems in the period 1996-2002. 
The data provides detailed information on individuals' medical conditions, medical 
and drug insurance coverage, drug purchases (if any), and other demographic and 
medical information. Individuals choose whether to purchase an anti-cholesterol 
drug and, if so, which drug to buy. The model permits flexible substitution patterns 
among drug choices and persistence in those choices by incorporating both observed 
and unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The estimates suggest that lower income 
patients without prescription drug insurance are very price sensitive: they are less 
likely to use drugs and, if they do use them, they tend to purchase the less expensive 
drugs. I find that roughly 500 thousand individuals without drug insurance who are 
currently not purchasing anti-cholesterol drugs would do so in the counterfactual 
world in which they are given the standard co-payment plan. 
The second paper also looks at consumer demands for anti-cholesterol drugs. 
While the first paper focused on the differentiated products, this paper explores 
the market expansion effects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA). The study 
combines the individual data used in the first paper with monthly expenditure data 
on DTCA for the period 1996-2002. The dynamic demand model estimated in this 
paper explores the heterogeneous effects of DTCA. Overall, I find a positive effect 
from DTCA with short term elasticity of 0.107. Through persistence in consumer 
demand this effect lasts over multiple time periods. I find that individuals not taking 
a cholesterol drug respond more to advertising than those on the drug. In addition, 
I find that less educated individuals, those that may be unaware of their health 
condition, and those without health insurance are most responsive to DTCA. 
Finally, the third paper studies the effect of product ownership and quality 
on entry in the airline industry. Specifically, this paper empirically examines the 
decision of an airline to offer high quality nonstop service between cities given that 
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the airline may or may not be offering lower quality one-stop service. I find that 
airlines that offer one-stop service through a hub are less likely to enter that same 
market with nonstop service than those that do not. In addition, the quality of the 
one-stop service is another determinant of entry. Airlines are more likely to enter 
a market with nonstop service if their own or their rival's one-stop service in the 
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The Impact of Prescription 
Drug Insurance on the Demand 
for Anti-Cholesterol Drugs 
1.1 Introduction 
According to Eric Topol (2004), an estimated 36 million people in the United States 
should be taking cholesterol reducing drugs from the statin class. However, only 
11 million are currently being treated.1 Furthermore, half of the people that begin 
statin drug therapy stop after six months, and only 30-40% are still taking their 
medication after one year.2 These statistics suggest a serious public health problem 
because high cholesterol is a primary risk factor in developing heart disease, the 
leading cause of death in the United States. One explanation for the underuse of 
1 Topel (2004) provides this statistic.   His estimates are based on current national guidelines for 
taking cholesterol drugs and population estimates from Ford et al (2003). 
2 These statistics are especially disturbing because it takes 6 months to 1 year for the benefits from 
the treatment to become perceptible. This information is from Third Report of the National Choe- 
lesterol Education Program:  Adult Treatment Panel III (NCEP (2001)).  This report is produced by 
a panel of doctors that summarize the most recent medical findings and provides recommendations 
for the testing and management of high cholesterol and a number of other subjects. 
2 
statin drugs is that they are expensive: the price of a years supply of a drug is 
over $700. The goal of this paper is to estimate the demand for statin drugs and 
determine how much of the "underuse" of statin drugs can be explained by high 
drug prices and the lack of full prescription drug insurance coverage. 
My data consists of panel data on a nationally representative sample of con- 
sumers who were diagnosed with cholesterol problems in the period 1996-2002. The 
data is from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which provides detailed 
information on the consumers' medical conditions, medical and drug insurance cov- 
erage, drug purchases (if any), and other demographic and medical information. 
The vast majority of individuals in the sample have medical insurance but only 
two-thirds have drug insurance. The typical insurance plan involves a co-payment, 
and covers roughly 65% of the patient's drug costs. 
Doctors are assumed to inform their patients about possible drug treatments. 
Patients then choose whether to use an anti-cholesterol drug and, if so, which drug to 
buy. I model their choices using a discrete-choice, mixed logit model with observed 
and unobserved product and consumer heterogeneity. The model permits flexible 
substitution patterns among the choices and persistence in those choices.3 It is 
particularly well-suited for modeling the demand for drugs since the effectiveness of 
drugs and their side-effects are idiosyncratic. The model is estimated using simulated 
maximum likelihood. 
The main empirical finding is that patients without prescription drug insur- 
ance, particularly low income patients, are quite sensitive to price. I use the demand 
estimates to calculate the consumer benefits of different drugs such as Lipitor, which 
entered the market in 1997, and generic brands, which have entered the market re- 
3 The importance of persistence in prescription drug choice by doctors and consumers is a well 
established in the literature. Hellerstein (1998) shows persistence in doctor prescribing patterns 
between generic and brand name drugs in the U.S., Coselli (2004) finds that consumers exhibit 
strong state dependence, and Richard and Van Horn (2004) find persistence in demand because 
many prescription drug purchases may be classified as automatic renewals. 
3 
cently. I also perform a number of policy experiments. When patients with no 
prescription drug insurance are given the standard co-payment plan, their demand 
for statin drugs increases by 9%, or roughly 500,000 individuals switch from not 
using statin drugs to using them.  In an out-of-sample counterfactual experiment 
where all individuals have full insurance, demand for statin drugs increases by 35%, 
with approximately 5 million individuals becoming users. 
The paper contributes to the recent empirical work that models the mar- 
ket for drugs as a differentiated market and estimates drug demands using discrete 
choice models. Cleanthous (2002) estimates demands for drugs in the antidepres- 
sant market using market share data, augmented with micro level data containing 
information on the joint distribution of income and insurance coverage in the pop- 
ulation. He adopts the approach pioneered by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). 
His objective is similar to mine, namely, to estimate the impact of prescription drug 
insurance and income on demands, and the welfare benefits from new drugs. The 
main difference between our studies is that I am able to match the individuals in- 
come, insurance coverage, and detailed condition information with their drug choice. 
A number of papers have shown that this type of information is important to ob- 
taining more realistic demand estimates.4   This issue may be especially important 
in health markets where insurance coverage and disease are both heterogeneous and 
correlated (e.g. cholesterol increases with age and Medicare covers most people over 
the age of 65).5
Wosinska (2002) also studies the market for statin drugs using panel data 
on individual drug choices. Her econometric model of consumer demand is similar 
to the one that I use.    Key differences are that she includes the individual's past 
4 e.g. Goldberg (1995), Petrin (2002) , and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2003). 
5 A number of other  papers have  also estimated market demand for prescription drugs using 
market share data including Ellison et al (1997) examining anti-ulcer drugs and applying a budget 
share approach, Stern (1996) looking across multiple drug classes and applying a nested logit model, 
among others (e.g. Rizzo (1999) and Berndt et al (1995) ) 
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choice in the econometric model and the choice set in her model does not include 
the choice of no drug. The reason she excludes the choice of no drug is that her 
data consists of a sample of purchasing records from privately insured individuals. 
Hence, she can estimate how individuals respond to price changes within the market 
but she cannot estimate the market expansion effects of price changes or changes in 
insurance. Her focus is primarily on the impact of direct-to-consumer advertising 
on consumer choices of prescription drugs.6
This paper is organized as follows:  The next section provides some back- 
	  
ground on the market for statin drugs. Section 3 describes the econometric model. 
Section 4 discusses the data followed by section 5 with a discussion of the results. 
Section 6 looks at welfare effects and section 7 presents results from policy experi- 
ments.   The last section concludes. 
1.2 The Market for Statln Drugs 
Statin drugs have been the top selling class of drugs in the U.S. during the period 
between 1999 to the present with total revenues of $12.5 billion dollars in 2002. 
Statin drugs are relatively new, with the first drug, Mevacor, introduced in 1987. 
Several drugs have entered the statin class since then including Pravachol, Zocor, 
Lescol, Lipitor, and Baycol.7 In 2002, Lipitor and Zocor were the highest selling 
drugs in the world.8 Each of these drugs was patented with a unique molecule and, 
for most of the sample these patents were enforceable. As a result, generic firms 
could not enter the market, and prices were relatively high. The typical cost per 
day was about $2.9   Revenues to the statin class of drugs were also high because 
6 Some other studies using micro level data to analyze market demand include Donohue and 
Berndt (2004) using claims data and Iizuka and Jin (2005) using National Ambulatory Medical 
Care data. 
7 Several other drugs have entered the class since the end of my sample in 2002. 
8 From IMS health pharmaceutical sales estimates. 
9 Generic manufacturers can legally offer new products in a market using the active molecule of 
a drug when the drugs patent expires. 
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of the prevalence of cholesterol problems and the effectiveness of these drugs at 
treating high cholesterol. According to estimates from the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 17 % of individuals over 20 have high cholesterol.10 For many 
patients, the consequence of not taking cholesterol reducing drugs is detrimental 
to their health. The world health organization estimates that high-cholesterol is a 
contributing factor to 4.4 million deaths in the world each year. It is a contributing 
factor in 56 % of clinical heart disease cases and 18 % of strokes.11 According to 
the national treatment guidelines reported in NCEP (2001), the primary goal of 
drug therapy for patients with high cholesterol is to attain lower LDL cholesterol 
levels. Evidence from epidemiological studies suggest that lower levels of LDL 
cholesterol (bad cholesterol) are associated with lower overall risk of clinical heart 
disease morbidity and mortality. The statin drugs are the most effective at lowering 
LDL cholesterol, have few side-effects, and are easy to administer.12
Statins  are  typically  the  first  drugs  prescribed  for  the  treatment  of  high 
cholesterol. They are an important part of the prevention of heart disease, stroke, 
atherosclerosis and other atherosclerotic conditions. Atherosclerotic conditions in- 
clude any condition related to the deposition of cholesterol that builds up as plaque 
on the innermost layer of the walls of large and medium-sized arteries. The ac- 
tive molecules in the statin class work by controlling the key enzyme that controls 
cholesterol in the body. The effect of statin drugs is that they lower LDL cholesterol 
(bad cholesterol) and triglycerides levels (also bad), and increase HDL levels (good 
cholesterol). 
Statin drugs offer significant advancements over preexisting drug treatments. 
10 0 The statistic is reported in Health, United States (2005). High cholesterol is defined as serum 
cholesterol levels of 240 or higher. This statistic is a projection of the number of individuals that 
have high cholesterol, so the number that actually know that they have a cholesterol problem is 
less. 
11 1 World Health Report (2002) 
12 2 One side effect may be myopathy accompanied with muscle aches, but the incidence of 
this occurring is low. 
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There are three other classes of drugs that may be used to treat high cholesterol. The 
second most effective class for lowering LDL cholesterol are bile-acid sequestrants. 
In addition to being less effective at reducing LDL levels, bile acid sequestrants are 
used less often than statins because of a variety of gastrointestinel side-effects among 
other problems . The other two classes of drugs, fibric acid derivatives and niacin, 
are the least effective at lowering LDL cholesterol, and they are primarily used for 
treating other aspects of cholesterol.  Fibric acid derivatives are typically used to 
treat high triglyciride levels, and niacin is effective at treating low HDL cholesterol. 
One might consider these other classes of drugs to be substitutes for the statin class, 
but they are often used in combination with statin drugs. The differences between 
the drug classes, and the possibility that they may be used in combination with 
statins, are the main reasons for excluding them from the current analysis. 
Although statin drugs have similar effects on the different components of 
cholesterol, the effectiveness of the drugs within the class varies. Table 1.1 lists 
some of the basic characteristics of the statin drugs.  The last two columns of Table 
1 indicate that Lipitor is relatively more effective at lowering LDL cholesterol at 
both the typical dose and high dose relative to the other drugs. This is important 
because cholesterol goals are more likely to be reached if a more effective drug is 
used.  Also, side effects are typically lower for lower doses of a drug.13
Statin drugs also vary in their effectiveness in treating different types of 
conditions. Table 1.2 reports the various conditions that the different statin drugs 
are indicated to treat. The information is drawn from the Clinical Pharmacology 
(2005) database.14 The conditions are listed in the first column.  The first three 
are primary treatments used to prevent a condition, and the last four are secondary 
13 3 It has been shown that increasing dosage levels of a drug also increases the occurrence of side 
effects. However, according to NCEP (2001) it is not clear how a low dose of one drug such as 
Lipitor compares to a high dose of a less effective drug such as Lescol. 
14 4 The Clincical Pharmacology database provides peer reviewed, clinically-relevant  information 






treatments used to stop or reverse an existing condition. The treatment of choles- 
terol is an example of primary treatment because lower cholesterol prevents heart 
disease and other diseases related to hardening of the arteries. All six drugs are 
indicated to treat each of the cholesterol disorders, with the exception of Mevacor, 
which is not indicated to treat high triglyciride levels. The treatment of atheroscle- 
rotic conditions is an example of secondary prevention because the goal is to stop 
or reverse the disease. The usefullness of the drugs in treating these conditions vary 
more widely than in the case of cholesterol disorders. Pravachol is indicated to treat 
all atherosclerotic conditions, whereas Baycol is not indicated to treat any of them. 
Even though certain statin drugs are more effective at lowering cholesterol, 
one brand is not necessarily the best drug for all people. For instance, if the goal 
of an individual is to lower her LDL cholersterol by only 20%, then all drugs are 
reasonable alternatives. Also, the effectiveness of drugs and their side effects are 
likely to be somewhat idiosyncratic. 
Table 1.3 documents the set of available drugs for each year in the sample 
period and their market shares in our sample. The most dramatic change in the 
market was the entry of Lipitor in 1997. Lipitor had over 15% of the market in its 
first year, and nearly half of the market by the end of 2002. By contrast, Baycol, 
which entered in 1998, had only 2% market share in its debut year. Its market share 
stayed small before it voluntarily withdrew in August of 2001 because it was linked 
to over 31 deaths caused by muscle cell damage. Although Baycol was relatively 
inexpensive, it did not offer any significant advantages over the drugs already in the 
market. Mevacor lost patent protection on December 17th of 2001. On the same 
day, several generic firms were approved by the FDA to produce drugs using Lo- 
vastatin, the active molecule in Mevacor. The generic versions of Mevacor captured 
approximately 5% of the statin market in their first year of entry. 
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1.3 Econometrlc Model 
In contrast to most consumer purchasing decisions, in prescription drug markets, 
consumers rely on their doctors to tell them which drug, if any, is best suited to treat 
their condition. The doctors inform their patients based on their knowledge about 
the clinical properties of the drugs from the medical literature, the treatment history 
of their patients, information from fellow doctors and advertisers, as well as their own 
personal experience in prescribing the medicine. I assume that doctors truthfully 
inform their patients about possible drug treatments and their effectiveness, and 
that patients then choose whether to use an anti-cholesterol drug and, if so, which 
drug to buy. In other words, I ignore any agency problems between doctors and 
their patients, and assume that patients are able to make an informed treatment 
decision. 
In each period, consumers choose a treatment that maximizes their utility. 
The set of treatment options is {0, ..., Jt} where Jt + 1 is the number of treatment 
options available in period t. Here the option 0 is the choice not to take a drug. 
The consumer only chooses one type of treatment. Given the information from the 
doctor, consumer i chooses option j E {0, ..., Jt + 1} in period t if 
uijt > uikt 'Ilk /   j 
I assume that consumer i's indirect utility for drug j, j /  0, at time t is given 
by 
uijt      aitpjt + j3itxjt + T ij + Eijt, 
where pjt is the price of drug j in period t, xjt is the vector of characteristics of 
drug j in period t, T ij is consumer specific taste parameter for drug j that does not 
vary over time, and Eijt is the idiosyncratic component of a consumer's utility for 
drug j that varies over time. The mean utility of the no drug option is normalized 
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to be zero. The response of consumer i to price and drug characteristics consists 
of a component that is common to all consumers and a component that depends 
upon her observed characteristics, zit, such as drug insurance coverage and health 
condition: 
ait      aO + alzit
and 
j3it        j3O + j3lzit. 
The consumer-specific unobservables that do not vary over time enter the 
model using an error component framework.  I allow T ij  to be correlated for j / 
0, but assume that T iO is independent. This allows drug options to be closer 
substitutes than the no drug option. Similarly, I allow for unobserved correlation 
between the branded version of Mevacor and it's generic counterpart. More 
precisely, I assume that T ij     F r(i where F is a fixed matrix of size Jt xM where 
each cell is either 0 or 
1. Although F ,r and (i change as the choice set changes. The vector (i is a vector
of i.i.d. normal random variables with unit variance. The matrix r is an M x M 
diagonal matrix of unknown parameters to be estimated. The error component 
framework can produce flexible correlation patterns over choices. In addition, it is 
fairly easy to introduce various correlations structures between choices. For instance, 
I can introduce drug specific heterogeneity in utility by including a single 1 in the 
column of F with the rest of the values in that column equal to zero. That value is 
multiplied by a parameter in r that corresponds to the standard deviation in utility 
for a specific drug. Including a column vector of all 1's in F except for the no-drug 
option allows for correlation among the drug choices. The covariance matrix for T i is 
'L,t         F rrtF t.  The first section of the appendix includes a more detailed discussion 
of the specification and covariance matrix used in this paper. 











Eijt  , is assumed to be distributed i.i.d.  extreme-value so that, conditional on ob- 
serving the vector T i, the probability of choosing option j takes the logit form: 
	  
	  
P robit(j, T )   
exp(aitpjt + j3itxjt + T ij ) 
k=Oexp(aitpkt + j3itxkt + T ik ) 
	  
I observe Ti distinct decisions for individual i .  Let this sequence of choices be 
denoted -j     {jl, ..., jTi }, so the probability of observing this sequence conditional 
on T i is: Ti exp(a p + j3 x  + T ) 




i  jt i  jt ijt 
t=O 'L,k=lexp(aipkt + j3ixkt + T ik ) 
Since T i  is not observed, it is necessary to integrate over the multivariate distribution 
j (T I'L,) to obtain the unconditional probability of observing the sequence of choices -j. 
The parameter matrix 'L, is the variance-covariance matrix of the consumer-specific 
errors.  The unconditional probability of the sequence of choices -j is: 
	  
r r  Ti 	   exp(a p 	   + j3 x 	   + T ) 
 e i(-j)   i  jtt Jt i  jtt ijt j (T I'L,)dT 
t=O 'L,k=lexp(aipkt + j3ixkt + T ik ) 
	  
The log-likelihood function is then: 
	  
) 
log( e i(-j)) 
i 
	  
The above integral does not have a closed form solution, so I employ simu- 
lation to integrate  over the distribution of T . Simulation is done by first taking R 
vectors of simulation draws from the distribution j (T I'L,) for each consumer. The 
rth vector of simulation draws T r  is taken from a standard normal distribution with 
unit variance and stacking these random draws in the vector (r and calculating 
	  
T r r r 
i      F r(i . For each T i  the probability a consumer makes the sequence of choices 
-j is evaluated, then I average the probabilities to obtain the predicted probability 
11 
i i 
that the consumer makes this sequence of decisions: 
 e   (-j) 
1 ) e (-j, T r ) 
i R  
i ij 
r=l,...,R 
The simulated log-likelihood function is then 
),
log(  e  (-j)). I search for the pa- 
	  
rameter values, {aO, j3O, al, j3l, r}, that minimize the simulated log-likelihood. The 
same simulation draws are used by the same consumers throughout the maximiza- 
tion procedure.15
Making sure that all the parameters in the model are identified can be tricky. 
Issues related to identification in mixed logit models are discussed in detail in Ben- 
Akiva at al (2001). To identify all the parameters of the model, I find that it is 
necessary to normalize certain parameters so that the model can be identified. One 
normalization of the model was made already by setting the variance of Eijt to w2/6 
which gives the logit probability above. Another normalization that is applied is to 
set the random error on the no drug treatment option to be equal to N (0, 1). The 
details involved in checking whether the model is theoretically identified is covered 
in the second section of the appendix. 
This paper uses maximum simulated likelihood to estimate the above model. 
One problem associated with maximum simulated likelihood is that bias arises for a 
finite number of simulation draws.16 There are a number of approaches for dealing 
with this bias. A brute force approach is to simply take a large number of random 
draws, but this is computationally taxing. In this paper I employ Halton sequences 
of random draws. Halton sequences are carefully selected psuedo-random draws 
that provide greater coverage with a fewer number of draws. This reduces bias and 
makes the estimation of the relevant integral more precise.   Train (2003) shows 
15 5 I do not apply individual weights during the estimation procedure, but population weights are 
used after the procedure in making predictions for the entire population. 
16 6 Let f s be the likelihood as calculated using simulation draws. Because of Jensen's  inequality 
Elog(f s)   log(Ef s) so there is bias in the procedure unless f s is very close to f . 
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that 100 random draws from a Halton sequence performs as well, if not better, than 
1000 random draws using the standard approach. The simulation procedure for my 
model uses 200 Halton sequence random draws.17 The standard errors of this model 
are computed in the usual way.18
The above model assumes that the consumer maximizes utility in each period. 
Persistence in consumer choices is captured through observable factors such as health 
conditions and the consumer-specific, unobservable factor that does not vary over 
time. I could attempt to separately identify state dependence and consumer specific 
heterogeneity by included the previous treatment choice of the consumer in the 
above model. This is the approach taken by Wosinska (2002). However, because 
the first choice of the consumer is not observed, including a variable indicating the 
consumers previous choice introduces an initial conditions problem. This problem 
arises if the random consumer-specific error is correlated with the initial treatment 
choice. An example of an unobserved consumer specific characteristic that might 
induce this type of correlation is the consumers unobserved LDL level for his first 
cholesterol check. 
A key identifying assumption of the model is that prices are uncorrelated with 
the consumer-specific unobservables. This assumption is commonly made in studies 
that use consumer level data (e.g., Goldberg (1995) and Shum (2004)). Villas-Boas 
and Winer (1999) is the one demand study that I am aware of that tries to account 
for price endogeneity. The problem arises from unobserved drug characteristics that 
affect every consumer's utility from the drug. Drug companies will tend to charge 
higher or lower prices depending upon whether the unobserved drug characteristics 
17 7 Although using Halton sequences significantly reduce the number of random draws needed 
to obtain unbiased estimates, the actual number of draws necessary to obtain precise estimates 
depends on the particular application. 
18 8 In calculating the standard errors I assume that the model specified is the true model,  and 
then I appeal to the asymptotic properties of  the maximum likelihood estimation to obtain the 
asymptotic standard errors. After completing the estimation procedure, the numerical hessian of 
the model is calculated. After obtaining the hessian I then multiply the hessian by negative one 
and take its inverse.  The standard errors are the square-root of the diagonal of the derived matrix. 
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have a positive or negative impact on demand. As a result, the consumer-specific 
unobservables will be correlated with prices. To address this issue, I include prod- 
uct dummy variables, which account for unobservable drug characteristics that are 
invariant over time. However, unobserved drug characteristics that vary over time 
and are correlated with price changes remains a problem. For example, any changes 
in consumers' perceptions about the relative effectiveness of the drugs due to new 
information or advertising are likely to be correlated with price changes. Additional 
analysis will be needed to determine the importance of this assumption. 
1.4 Data
The main data source used in this paper is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) from 1996-2002. The survey contains extensive information on medical 
care in the United States, and it is used to provide national estimates on health 
care use, medical expenditures, and insurance coverage for the U.S. civilian, nonin- 
stitutionalized population. The MEPS selects a random sample of households and 
surveys all individuals in a household. It follows the individuals for two years, dur- 
ing which it records information on individuals in 5 rounds, where each round is 
approximately 4-6 months. The data recorded in each round includes details on the 
individual's insurance, demographic characteristics, health condition, and medical 
expenditures. In the analysis that follows, I will define a period as a round. The 
MEPS study supplements the survey data by contacting the individual's medical 
providers and pharmacies to obtain billing information. For instance, if a patient 
reports purchasing Zocor from a specific pharmacy, the pharmacy is contacted to 
provide a payment history for all purchases of Zocor from the individual. Each year 
approximately 15,000 individuals enter the data so the data set is an overlapping 
panel. 
The  survey  reports  whether  individuals  have  medical  and/or  prescription 
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drug insurance and the type of plans. If the insurance plan is public, then the 
data identifies the provider, that is, whether it is Medicare, Medicaid, or some 
other public agency. Medicare provides medical insurance but no prescription drug 
insurance, whereas Medicaid provides both. The data on private plans includes 
whether the plan covers doctors visits, prescription drugs, and/or other services. 
Additional information about the individual's insurance coverage can be inferred 
from the individual's medical expenditures. Each time a consumer visits a doctor or 
purchases medical services such as prescription drugs, the survey records the amount 
charged and who pays, whether the payment is paid directly by the consumer or 
paid by a third party. The third party payments are classified as private, Medicare, 
Medicaid or various other types of public insurances. Unfortunately, the MEPS 
data does not provide detailed information on the structure of the individual's drug 
insurance plan.19 The MEPS only contains information on payments for drugs 
purchased by an individual, and not on drugs that she does not purchase. For 
example, if an individual purchases Zocor, we observe her out-of-pocket cost for 
Zocor, but not for other statin drugs that she could have purchased. 
Individuals are asked to write about their current medical condition  and 
health history, including when their medical problems began. For each medical 
event (e.g., doctor visit or prescription drug purchase), individuals are asked about 
the medical conditions that gave rise to the event. Professional coders take the 
information provided by the individual and assign one of 5 digit ICD-9 codes (In- 
ternational Classification of Disease Code, Ninth Revision) which describe the in- 
dividual's medical condition. To protect the identity of individuals in the sample, 
the 5 digit ICD-9 code is aggregated into 3 digit ICD-9 codes. The 5 digit ICD-9 
codes are also aggregated into 260 clinically meaningfully categories using Clinical 
Classification Software.   In this paper, both the 3 digit ICD-9 codes and clincial 
19 9 There is a wide variety of features that an insurance plan might have such as formulary 
restric- tions, deductibles, and copayments that may be fixed or vary across drugs. 
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classification codes are used to describe the individuals medical condition. After 
reviewing risk factors mentioned in the NCEP (2001) report, and with the help of 
Dr. Rasmussen, I classified the 3 digit ICD-9 and clinical classification codes into 
the four categories: cholesterol disorders, atherosclerotic conditions, diabetes and 
hypertension. The classification is described in Table 1.4. The only group requiring 
more than one code was atherosclerotic conditions. This grouping consists of vari- 
ous forms of heart disease, atherosclerosis, stroke or prior heart attacks. All of the 
problems listed above are chronic conditions, so that once an individual is observed 
as having the condition, he is assumed to continue to have the condition. 
The prescription drug transaction data provided in the MEPS includes the 
quantity, the strength, and the National Drug Code (NDC) of each drug purchased. 
The NDC code is a number that uniquely identifies a drug and can be used to link 
the drug to the manufacturer and a specific product. Conversion from the NDC 
code to a specific product is done using online data available from the FDA website 
that links NDC codes to the products and manufacturer. In cases where the NDC 
code of the drug is not listed, I used the name of the drug's active molecule as listed 
by the pharmacist, and whether the drug is branded or generic to determine the 
identity of the statin drug.20   Recall that, for most of the sample period, the drugs 
in the statin class are branded and have a unique molecule.21
The data on visits to medical providers include visits to the doctors office, 
inpatient and outpatient hospital visits, and emergency room visits.   Detailed in- 
20 0 The MEPS data center uses a proprietary database to impute the NDC code for their internal 
use, but this is not publicly available. 
21 1 In a few cases, I was not able to identify the drug. At the end of 2001 the drug Mevacor goes off 
patent. At this time a number of generics enter the market that also use Mevacor's active molecule 
called Lovastatin. I group the drugs sharing the Lovastatin molecule into two categories, branded 
and generic. Another case where a unique drug cannot be assigned to a round is when multiple 
Statin drugs are purchased. Since multiple Statin drugs are typically not prescribed, it is likely 
that a patient has switched drugs. So in cases where two drugs are purchased in a round, I assign 
the last drug taken in the round. I use information on the drug taken in the previous or following 
round to determine the drug that a person is switching to. If that information is not available I 
assign the drug with the greatest quantity purchased in the round. 
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formation on each visit is recorded including information on the date of the visit, 
expenditures on the visit, and the condition related to the visit. These data are 
used to determine whether and when consumers are informed about their medical 
conditions and possible treatments. 
I performed two checks on the MEPS data to determine whether the sample is 
representative. I compared its estimate of the number of uninsured to that reported 
in the Census for 2002 and found that they matched. The Census estimate of 
the number of uninsured is 45.8 million, while the number from the MEPS is 43.6 
million. I also computed the annual estimated national revenue shares in the MEPS 
of the top three sellers - Lipitor, Pravachol and Zocor - and compared them to the 
those reported in IMS health. IMS health is a pharmaceutical market research firm 
that monitors drug sales from pharmacies. It reports total revenue data for the 
statin class and for each of the three top sellers for the years 1999-2002.22  Table 
1.5 reports the IMS and MEPS revenues shares for the three drugs for each year 
during the period 1999-2002. The differences are relatively small, differing by at 
most 3.22% in any one year. I conclude that the MEPS sample provides a good 
approximation to the market. 
1.4.1 Variables 
The dependent variable used in this paper is the treatment choice in a round. The 
treatment choices include the statin drugs that are available in the market during 
the round and the no-drug treament option. As stated previously, I assume that if 
the individual takes any drug in a round, then she is considered to be using drugs 
in that round. 
In determining the size of the market, I apply two rules. First, I limit the set 
of potential buyers to those with either a cholesterol disorder or an atherosclerotic 
22 2 I would have liked to have a more detailed comparison, but unfortunately this data was 
too expensive. 
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condition. Second, a person must be informed to be included in the sample. I define 
a consumer as informed in a round if he has visited a doctor or taken a drug in the 
current or previous round. Although a consumer may know he has a condition, if he 
does not visit a doctor, he may not be aware of the treatment options available. I 
drop the first round for each individual in the sample in order to account for potential 
stockpiling of drugs used in subsequent rounds. To account for stockpiling, I assume 
that the average daily dose for each drug is taken, and I divide the total quantity of 
dosages purchased by the average daily dose to determine the number of treatment 
days purchased. If the number of doses exceed the number of days in a round, that 
dosage is carried to the following round.  A person is considered to be choosing 
a drug treatment if they use any amount of a drug in a round. Based on these 
selection rules the total number of individuals included is 10,136 and the number 
of individual rounds is 33,192. The percentage of individual rounds in which statin 
drugs were used is 36.92%. By comparison, statin drug use in indivudal rounds that 
were excluded from the sample is less than one percent, 0.57%. The percentage 
probably represents people with other types or combinations of risk factors such as 
diabetes, hypertension, or a family history of heart disease who may also be taking 
statin  drugs. 
I turn next to a description of the variables of the model. The dependent 
variables are binary variables: Drugit is equal to 1 if individual i uses statin drugs in 
period t, and Drugijt, is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if individual i uses drug 
j in period t. Individual i's state of health in period t is described by four dummy 
variables: CHit for a cholesterol disorder, HDit for atherosclerotic conditions, DBit
for diabetes, and HY Pit for hypertension. Since cholesterol levels tend to increase 
with age, and men are at a higher risk of heart disease at a younger age, I also include 
the variable Agei and an indicator for M alei.23  Finally, individual i's family income 
23 3 Although one might think of including race, current treatment guidelines specified in 
NCEP (2001) conclude that treatment should not change by race. 
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in period t is measured in 1996 dollars as Log(incit).24
The characteristics of the drugs that are invariant over time are captured 
using product-specific dummies. The products in the market are:  Lipitor, Baycol, 
P ravachol, Zocor, Lescol, M evacor and  Generic(M evacor). I  use  the variable 
log(AgeM oleculej ) to account for the possibility that consumer perception of the 
molecule of drug j changes over time, perhaps due to advertising.25
I use binary variables for insurance coverage. The variable M edinsit is equal 
to 1 if individual i has medical insurance in period t and zero otherwise. Medical 
insurance coverage typically covers doctor office visits and other services, which 
makes it more likely that insured individuals will obtain statin drugs and maintain 
treatment, even when they do not have prescription drug insurance. Individuals 
on private plans, Medicaid, Medicare, or other public insurance plans are classified 
as medically insured. I also include individuals with prescription drug insurance 
coverage because it is rare for individuals with drug insurance not to have medical 
insurance. 
The variable Druginsit is equal to 1 if the individual i has drug insurance 
in period t and zero otherwise. An individual is classified as having prescription 
drug coverage if she has a private prescription drug insurance or is on Medicaid. 
This definition of drug coverage should account for nearly all individuals with drug 
insurance. According to Health, United States 2005, in 2002, 30% of drug expen- 
ditures in the United States are paid out-of-pocket, while private insurance and 
Medicaid paid nearly all the remaining expenditures. Private insurers and Medicaid 
accounted for 48% and 18% of drug expenditures, respectively. The remaining 2% 
24 4 For negative income levels that make up less than .25% of the sample I set income equal to 1, 
000. A justification for this is that households often overstate self employment expenses because 
they report capital expenditures in self-employment expenses when only current expenditures 
should be used. 
25 5 The age of the molecule is the median date in the current round minus the date in which  the 
molecule was approved for sale by the FDA divided by 365.  I add one to the age of the molecule 
so that the log value starts at zero. 
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of expenditures were covered by Medicare. To account for the possibility of mis- 
reporting by consumers, I use prescription drug expenditure information provided 
by the MEPS to mark individuals as covered if a third party pays for a significant 
amount of their drug coverage for the year. I broaden the definition of those with 
prescription drug insurance by counting individuals as insured if their expenditures 
on prescription drugs are over $200 a year and over 70% of their expenditures are 
covered by another party.26 To check the validity of the prescription drug insurance 
variable, I looked at payments made by consumers in the sample. The average per- 
son with private prescription drug coverage only pays 34.5% out-of-pocket, and the 
typical person on Medicaid pays approximately 31.5%. Using my definition of drug 
coverage, I find that those with prescription drug coverage pay 33.3% out-of-pocket, 
while those that have no prescription drug insurance pay 84.9% out-of-pocket. The 
fact that people without coverage do not pay the full out-of-pocket price suggests 
that people are using alternative public sources of coverage such as neighborhood 
clinics or State programs. 
One may worry that the insurance variables are correlated with the consumer- 
specific unobservables due, say, to an unobserved health condition. Unhealthy people 
may be more likely to have insurance and purchase prescription drugs. This selec- 
tion effect would cause an upward bias on the impact of insurance on the demand 
for drugs. There are three reasons to believe that selection does not pose a major 
problem. First, the detailed health condition information included in the data ac- 
counts for the most important risk factors that would affect the individual's decision 
to take statin drugs. Second, statin drugs are only a fraction of an individual's total 
prescription drug expenditure, and the decision to purchase insurance is likely to be 
based on total expected drug expenditure.  Third, in many cases, consumers have 
a limited choice for insurance coverage because it is often provided by an employer 
26 6 The $200 is total expenditures including statin drugs and all other types of drugs 
purchased for a given year. 
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or the government, and purchasing insurance as an individual rather than through 
a group plan can be much more expensive. 
The price of drug j in period t is denoted P ricejt. This price is calculated 
on an annual basis from transactions involving drug j. The task is complicated by 
the fact that what is observed in the data are transaction prices that vary by the 
strength of the drug per tablet, which is measured in milligrams, and the size of the 
bottle, which is measured in number of tablets. For example, Lipitor is available in 
strengths of 10mg, 20mg, 40mg and 80mg per tablet, and bottle sizes are typically 
30, 60 or 90 tablets. Therefore, the number of prices for Lipitor is the number of 
strengths available times the number of bottle sizes, which in this case, is 12. In 
order to compare prices across different drugs, I choose a single price for each drug. 
The price chosen is the one associated with the bottle containing 30 tablets (the 
most frequently purchased quantity) of the strength that corresponds to a daily 
dose for the typical consumer who uses that drug (the strength varies across drugs 
according to their effectiveness).27 In order to calculate this price, I first take each 
transaction in period t involving a bottle of 30 tablets of daily dose strength and 
then divide by the number of tablets in the bottle. This generates a distribution of 
transaction prices for each drug, since prices vary across locations. P ricejt is the 
median transaction price. I use the median rather than the mean to eliminate the 
effects of outliers. 
There are two important reasons for selecting price points for each drug rather 
than using an alternative measure of price, such as a price index. First, for drugs 
that are less frequently purchased (e.g. Baycol) I do not want small movements 
in the number of people using a particular strength to have a large effect on price 
estimates.  Second, there may be a bias from using a price index rather than price 
27 7 For the class of statin drugs the usual dose is the initial dose. Looking at the strengths of the 
drugs, I found that in the initial strength is also the most frequently. This may be the expected 
cost of individuals. 
21 
points when there is entry and exit in the market. For example, when Lipitor enters 
the market one might expect that people with high LDL levels would switch to 
Lipitor. This could affect the price index of other drugs even if actual price points 
do not change. 
I compute annual prices rather than prices by round. This is because the 
prescribed medicines file contains several thousand imputations that involve using 
average annual wholesale price as the price of the drug rather than the actual trans- 
action price. This is done in cases where the data on expenditures is missing or in 
cases where prices seem to be outliers.28 The price calculation by round would be 
bias toward the average annual wholesale price in each half of the year. For instance, 
if actual retail prices are rising the entire year, then the bias would be positive in 
the first half of the year and negative in the second. In fact, when I attempted 
to estimate price for the first and second half of the year, I found that the price 
during the year remained relatively flat as might be expected if this bias exists. By 
imputing annual prices rather than prices in each half of the year, I avoid this type 
of bias. Future work will look for an alternative sources for price information. 
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.6 provides descriptive statistics on the variables of the model. The second 
column of the table provides the mean of each variable. A key demographic difference 
in the sample is the age. The median age is 64 which is much higher than the national 
median age of about 35. This is not surprising given that cholesterol increases 
with age as does the incidence of atherosclerotic conditions. The median household 
income of the selected population is $30,391 which is slightly lower than that of the 
U.S. population of $35,162. 
I find that only 3.4 % of the selected sample have no medical insurance which 
28 8 A detailed discussion of the imputation process is available in the methodology report at 
the MEPS website. (http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/). 
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is a small fraction relative to the national average of about 16 % in 2002. One should 
expect the sample to have a high level of coverage because nearly half the sample 
is eligible for Medicare. Relative to the fraction without medical insurance, the 
fraction without drug insurance is considerably higher, at 29.0%. This, in part, 
reflects the fact that Medicare provides little prescription drug coverage during the 
period of the sample. 
This table also shows the prevalence of the conditions examined. One can 
see that all of the selected conditions are relatively common in the sample. It is 
very common for a person to have a combination of these conditions. I also list the 
prices of the various products in the market. Looking at the prices of the three top 
selling drugs Lipitor Zocor and Pravachol, one can see that Zocor and Pravachol are 
more expensive than Lipitor. 
1.5 Results 
Before estimating the full choice model, I estimate a probit model of the drug versus 
no drug choice (i.e., the dependent variable is Drugit). This model can be viewed 
as a simplified version of the demand model in which statin drugs are aggregated 
into a single product, and the consumers decision is whether or not to buy. Using 
the probit model, I examine how family income, individual insurance coverage and 
health conditions affect the decision to use statin drugs. The price in the probit 
model is a price index based on weighted expenditure shares of each product in the 
market and include it in the analysis. I also include a linear time trend to account 
for growth in market demand.29
The probit model is estimated with and without random effects.  In the 
random effects model, the probability that an individual i purchases a statin drug 
29 9 I  could  have  included  year  dummies  to  capture  trend  but  then  price  effects  would  not 
be identified since prices are annual. 
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is given by 
if>(xitj3 + T i) 
where if> is the standard normal distribution, and the unobserved consumer-specific 
utility T i is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard devi- 
aton atau. In the standard probit, T i 0. The differences in the estimates provides 
information on the importance of consumer heterogeneity. 
Table 1.7 report the estimates of the two models. The second column re- 
port the estimates of the coefficients of the probit model without random effects, 
and the third column reports their average partial effects. The partial effect is the 
percent change in the probability evaluated at the population mean. For continu- 
ous independent variables, such as price, the marginal probability is calculated for 
small changes in the independent variable. The change is calculated while the other 
independent variables in the model are fixed at the mean level of the population. 
The effect of price on demand for statin drugs is negative and significant. It may 
be interpreted as the price elasticity of demand for a typical individual in the pop- 
ulation. For binary variables, the change in the probability for a typical person is 
calculated. For doctors insurance, a discrete change in insurance status increases 
the use of statin drugs by 9.6% for a typical person, and having prescription drug 
insurance increases demand by an additional 4.4%.30 Individuals with cholesterol 
and atherosclerotic conditions are significantly more likely to purchase statin drugs. 
Finally, individuals who are older, male and with higher income are significantly 
more likely to use statin drugs. The trend coefficient implies a strong upward trend 
in demand. 
The fourth and fifth column reports the estimates of the coefficients of the 
random effects probit model and their average partial effects, respectively. The 
random effects probit differs from the regular probit because it includes a random 
30 0 Still need to check this partial effect 
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component, T i  for each individual that is normally distributed and is constant over 
time.  The estimate of atau  is the standard deviation in the population estimates. 
The probit models provide useful information about the effect of insurance, 
income and health conditions on the individual's decision to use statin drugs. How- 
ever, they are not very informative about market expansion.  In particular, it is not 
clear how much of the market expansion is due to changes in prices, in the demo- 
graphics of the consumers, or in the choice set of drugs. The discrete choice model 
addresses this question. The specification that I estimate involves a number of in- 
teraction terms. Most plans involve a copayment that is a fixed dollar amount that 
does not vary with the drug chosen, and to capture this effect, I interact Drugins 
with a dummy variable tatin.  tatin is a variable that is 1 if the option is a statin 
drug, and 0 otherwise. One would expect this variable to be negative because the 
copayment is costly to consumers. However, it is also common for insurance plans to 
induce some price sensitivity through formulary restrictions, tiered copayment struc- 
tures or a deductible. To allow some flexibility in how insured individuals respond 
to price, I include an interaction of P rice and Drugins. This variable is expected 
to be positive and less than the mean price coefficient. To capture differences in the 
cost of visiting a doctor for insured and uninsured individuals, the variable M edins 
is interacted with tatin. The variables describing the individual's health, age, and 
gender are also interacted with tatin. Finally, the variables CH and HD are inter- 
acted with a dummy variable for each molecule in order to capture the effectiveness 
of each molecule in treating each condition.31 Note that the chemical compound for 
Zocor is left out of the interaction. Zocor must be left out of the interaction to avoid 
multicollinearity between the tatin and other drug dummy variables.  Therefore, 
the interpretation of the molecule dummy-condition interactions are relative to Zo- 
31 1 Note that I interact HD and CH with dummies of chemical compound of each drug and 
not drug dummies. The only difference is that generics for the statin drug Mevacor enter the 
market in 2002. I assume that the difference in preference between the drug and it's generic 
equivalent are captured through the product dummy variables. 
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D 
cor. Finally, I normalize the alternative specific constant on the no-drug treatment 
choice to zero. 
Table 1.8 reports the estimates of the model with no time-invariant, consumer- 
specific unobservables (i.e., T ij       0).  Given this assumption, the model reduces to 
a conditional logit. Column two reports the coefficient estimates for the model in 
which the molecule-health condition interactions are excluded, and column four re- 
ports the coefficient estimates when the interactions are included. In both models, 
the coefficient estimates on the variables involving price, income, and insurance have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant. The market response to price is 
negative for all income levels. The 75th percentile of log(inc) is approximately 4, so 
even individuals with high incomes and insurance coverage are sensitive to price. A 
likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that molecule-condition interactions 
are insignificant. The estimates show that Zocor (the molecule left out of the equa- 
tion) is valued relative to other drugs for the treatment of atherosclerotic conditions, 
and Baycol, which is not indicated to treat any of the atherosclerotic conditions, is 
least valued. The Lipitor molecule seems to be preferred by individuals with choles- 
terol disorders, which one might expect since Lipitor is the most effective drug at 
lowering LDL cholesterol. 
Table 1.9 reports the estimates of the random coefficient model. Recall that 
this model has random parameters for each product and, in addition, random pa- 
rameters that allow for correlation over the drug treatment options and over the 
branded and generic version of Mevacor. That is, there is some component to un- 
observed utility T ij that is common to all drug treatments and another component 
that is common for branded and Generic versions of Mevacor. This may be seen by 
looking at the covariance matrix shown in the appendix. One can see that parame- 
ter a2 is the covariance between all statin drug choices.  Consequently, 9 random 
parameters are introduced into the model that were not in the conditional logit. 
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The results of this model differ significantly from the conditional logit model. The 
standard deviations of the random-coefficients are highly significant, suggesting that 
consumer heterogeneity is very important. The only random coefficient that is in- 
significant is the correlation over the Lovastatin molecule. The fit of the model as 
measured by the log-likelihood is -24, 241.9, which represents an increase of 12, 550 
over the log-likelihood of the conditional logit model. Obviously this is a very sig- 
nificant improvement in the fit of the model as implied by the log-likelihood ratio 
test. The reason for such a large improvement in the fit is that the model captures 
additional persistence for users, and it allows for more flexible substitution patterns 
between the choices. 
A key difference between the results of the conditional and mixed logit is 
that the magnitudes of the parameters increase significantly in the mixed logit spec- 
ification. The coefficients of many variables increase by a factor of 2 or 3. The most 
important economic difference between the two models is the change in the relative 
magnitudes of the coefficients on the insurance and price variables. They imply that 
insurance and income have a greater impact on the sensitivity of consumers to price 
when the consumer heterogeneity is taken into account. 
1.5.1 Marginal Effects and Cross-Price Elasticities 
The calculation of the marginal effects of the insurance variables, income and price 
are for the last year of the sample, 2002. The choice set at this point includes 
all of the brands as well as a generic. It is also the year in which the size of the 
sample is the largest: 3,759 individuals. For the insurance variables, I calculate 
the percentage change in total use based on a change in insurance coverage. More 
precisely, for choice j 
insuranceChangej
Dj (insured) - Dj (U ninsured) 
Dj (U ninsured) 
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where Dj  denotes the market demand for drug j. The income elasticity is based on 




D(log(inci * (1 + /:)Jnci ))) - D(inci) .  /:)Jnci 
Cross-price elasticities are computed for the un-weighted full sample. I only include 
one observation for each individual in this year. The change in the expected quantity 




Di(pj * (1 + /:)pj )) - Di(pj ) 
  /:)pj
where /:)pj  is 10 percent. 
Table 1.10 shows the results of these calculations for the insurance variables 
and income. The insurance variables have a significant impact on drug use. An 
increase in the number of individuals with prescription drug insurance and medical 
insurance increases demand by approximately 10% and 9% respectively. These 
results are quite similar to the results of the probit models. A possible reason for 
why they are slightly higher in the mixed logit model is that these estimates for 2002 
when Lipitor is available.32 The income elasticities are quite small. For example, a 
10% increase in income increases drug usage by about 0.26% in the population. 
The cross-price elasticities measure the sensitive of consumers to price and 
the degree of substitutability between the drugs. The first panel shown in table 16 
reports estimates of the own and cross-price elasticity. All own-price elasticities are 
negative and small in absolute value, indicating the demand is inelastic. Demand for 
Lipitor and Lescol are the most inelastic, followed by Pravachol and Zocor. Demand 
for the generic version of Mevacor is the most price elastic. In his study of the anti- 
32 2 The marginal effects calculated here are different from the marginal effects in the probit 
cal- culation. The probit calculation took the marginal effect at a particular point. The estimates 
here take the change in demand for the entire population. 
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depressant market, Cleanthous obtains own-price elasticities estimates ranging from 
-.02 to -.45. My estimates also fall in this range.33 Our results contrast with earlier 
work by Stern (1996) and Ellison et al (1997) that find demand for many drugs 
to be price elastic. The difference may be that our studies account for consumer 
heterogeneity, and in particular, insurance. Another possibility may be that the 
drugs analyzed in this paper are mostly branded drugs, and Ellison et al find that 
price elasticities are typically lower for branded drugs. However, it is impossible 
to determine the exact reason for this difference because both the data and the 
methodology vary accross these studies. 
The second panel in the table reports estimates of the own and cross-price 
elasticities when everyone in the sample is given the "typical" prescription drug 
insurance plan. That is, I simply turn on the prescription drug coverage variable for 
the entire sample of individuals in 2002. The price elasticities increase considerably. 
The third panel reports estimates of price elasticities when no one in the sample 
has prescription drug insurance. A comparison of these two panels of estimates 
indicates that individuals without drug insurance are on average 5-6 times more 
price sensitive than individuals with drug insurance. 
1.6 Welfare 
The goal of this section is to calculate the amount of consumer surplus each product 
brings to the market. The consumer surplus calculation follows the calculations in 
Cleanthous (2002) who examines innovation in the antidepressant market.34 Con- 
ditional on observing the random parameters of the model, individual i's consumer 
33 3 Other studies including Berndt et al (1995) examining the anti-ulcer drug market and 
Rizzo (1999) looking at anti-hypertensive drugs also find own-price elasticities in the inelastic 
range. 
34 4 A paper by Ellickson et al (2000) discusses how to compute the welfare when price sensitivity 





welfare Wi is calculated as: 
ln(
),Jt exp(aipj t + j3 xj t + T ij )) 
Wi(T ij ) 
jt=O t i t
-ai
The above formula is arrived at by integrating over consumer i's demand curve given 
T ij . Since the random parameters of the model T ij are not observed, I use simulation 
to estimate the expected surplus of each individual ET  W Jt . 
There are a number of ways in which surplus from the introduction of a 
new good can be examined. For instance, one could examine the impact of Lipitor 
on welfare by examining the gains before and after its entry. However, a number 
of factors change over time, including factors such as the age and income of the 
population, prices, and, of course, the choice set. To avoid these problems, I follow 
the approach taken by Cleanthous (2002) and measure the welfare gains of drug j 
in a single time period t for good j by calculating the expected surplus with drug j 
in the market, EW Jt , and subtract the expected surplus when drug j is excluded, 
-j EW t   , holding constant the prices of other drugs. (Thus I ignore the effects of a 
i 
new drug on prices of rival drugs, and the benefits that competition can confer on 
non-users of the new drug.) Using this approach, I calculate total consumer surplus,
j),N Jt J - 
i=l EWi -EWi 
t
 for each drug in the market. I also calculate average consumer
surplus above the price of the product for consumers that purchased the product: 
),N Jt J -j




Drug insurance complicates the consumer surplus calculation because consumers 
with insurance do not have to pay the full market price for the drug. To avoid this 
complication, I calculate consumer surplus for people assuming that they do not 
have prescription drug insurance. This is also the approach taken by Cleanthous. 
Table 1.12 shows the results of the consumer surplus calculations. The first 
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column of the table shows the price of the drugs in 2002, the second column shows 
the consumer surplus for the typical consumer that use the product, and the third 
column reports the ratio of consumer surplus to price. The typical consumers that 
use Lipitor or Lescol receive the greatest consumer surplus. The oldest drug in 
the class, Mevacor, and its generic version, generate the lowest consumer surplus. 
One potential reason is that Merck owns both Zocor and Mevacor, and may have 
an incentive to keep the price of Mevacor high to push consumers toward Zocor in 
anticipation of Mevacor going off patent. The branded version of Mevacor generates 
higher consumer surplus than the generic. 
The fourth column shows the ratio of consumer surplus per purchase divided 
by price. This means that for Zocor that has a ratio of .92 one would expect that 
the average consumer that purchased Zocor to be willing to spend 92% more than 
the price. The ratios are fairly stable and average approximately 1 across the goods, 
with Lipitor and Lescol being the highest. The primary reason for looking at this 
result is to compare to Cleanthous' work that performs a similar calculation for 
the antidepressant market. Cleanthous finds this ratio varies significantly with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 24. The greater diversity in the range of this 
ratio in Cleanthous' work is likely due to the greater diversity of products in the 
anti-depressant market relative to the statin class. However, a ratio of 24 for Prozac, 
a branded drug, implies that consumers are willing to pay 24 times the price of the 
drug, which seems inconsistent with profit maximizing behavior. The results from 
my estimates seem more reasonable in magnitude. 
Column four of Table 1.13 reports total consumer surplus calculated at the 
current market price. I quantify the total  surplus  for  consumers  at  the  current 
price in terms of dollars of surplus per year for the selected sample representing 30 
million consumers. Lipitor produces considerably more consumer surplus than the 
other drugs in the market with approximately 6 billion dollars in surplus a year, 
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while Zocor, the second highest selling drug brings less than half that. One might 
argue that Lipitor bringing considerable surplus to the market may be due solely to 
its lower market price. To check this I look at the consumer surplus assuming that 
all drugs cost the same amount. At a price of $ 1.15, which is the 2004 average- 
wholesale-price (AWP) price of generic Mevacor in 1996 dollars, I find that some of 
the welfare is due to the price, but the consumer surplus from Lipitor is still double 
that of Zocor's.  This result suggests that the innovation of the more effective drug 
Lipitor is substantial even after controlling for price differences among the products. 
Another reason for evaluating consumer surplus at a price of $1.15 is that one might 
think of this as a close proxy to actual marginal cost because one might expect the 
cost of producing and delivering similar drugs to be the same. Therefore, consumer 
surplus at the generic price represents the total social welfare from Lipitor. The 
consumer surplus at the marginal cost is approximately 1 billion dollars greater 
than the current consumer surplus. 
Although the consumer welfare results are interesting, they raise the ques- 
tion of why consumers value these drugs. The three drugs that bring the highest 
surplus are also the three drugs that have had the highest expenditures on direct- 
to-consumer (DTC) advertising.35  I hope to explore this issue in future work. 
1.7 Policy Experiments 
This section explores the results of two policy experiments. The first section exam- 
ines how various cost related factors affect market expansion. The second section 
examines how cost factors affect which drug is chosen. The final section measures 
the consumer surplus that each product brings to the market in 2002.Drug Costs 
and Market Expansion Effects 
This section examines how cost play a role in consumer's decision of whether 
35 5 Lipitor, Pravachol and Zocor account for nearly all of the expenditures on DTC advertising. 
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to purchase a statin drug. Table 1.14 explores a series of policy experiments on a 
selected cross section of consumers in the sample. Included in the sample are 3, 759 
people that represent over 30 million people nationally, a representative 8 million 
of these people do not have prescription drug insurance. The estimates also predict 
the number of insured individuals taking prescription drugs. The within sample 
predictions of the number of drug insured and drug uninsured individuals taking 
prescription drugs are very similar. 
The first set of counterfactual policy experiments is on the set of consumers in 
the sample. In policy experiment 1 I provide all consumers with a typical insurance 
plan. That is, the dummy variable Drugins is set to 1 for these consumers. I find 
that this increases the number of users of statin drugs by over 500 thousand people. 
The next policy experiment is motivated by a study from the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services36 that estimated that in 1999 cash payers such as 
those without drug insurance37  typically pay about 14.6% more than third party 
payers such as private HMO insurance plans. Frank (2001) provides a more complete 
discussion of price discrimination in prescription drug retail markets. The reason 
for price discrimination is that institutions such as insurers and pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs)have buyer power and are able to negotiate significantly lower 
prices for prescription drugs. Using estimates from the model, I find the market 
expansion effect from a 15% drop in price for all drugs is 5.8%, representing 300,000 
additional users. Frank cites estimates that prices charged to managed care plans 
purchased via mail order are 30% less than cash payments. To explore this effect 
on price, policy experiment 3 reduces price in the market by 30%. I find that this 
increases prescription drug use by 11.65%, which is greater than the expansion from 
providing prescription drug insurance. The magnitudes of these different effects 
suggest that controlling prices paid by cash payers may by another effective way of 
36 6 Report to the President (2000) 
37 7 This also includes indemnity insurance plans 
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expanding prescription drug use for those without drug insurance. 
Policy experiment 4 examines the effect of removing all cost factors for con- 
sumers. In the model this is equivalent to setting P rice 0 for all consumers, and 
assuming that no consumer pays a copayment (i.e. Their is no negative effect on 
the interaction term for tatin and Drugins). I look at the impact on both con- 
sumers with prescription drug insurance and those without. I find that removing 
cost as a factor expands the number of users for both those with and without drug 
insurance, but the impact is 18% higher for the uninsured. The difference in the 
impact is greater than the 9.76% difference, which suggests that income difference 
between insured and uninsured groups may also be an important factor determining 
prescription drug use. Overall, I find that removing cost as a factor increases use 
by 35% which suggests that over 5 million people are not taking drugs because of 
their cost. While an additional 5 million consumers would take these drugs, there 
are still approximately 10 million consumers in my sample not taking drugs that are 
doing so for reasons not related to cost. Note that some caution should be taken 
in interpreting these results because this is clearly an out-of-sample counterfactual 
experiment. 
Another important question is what type of individuals are affected by mar- 
ket expansion. Table 1.14 makes this comparison for policy experiment 4. The 
first two columns of the table compare actual health conditions of patients with the 
predicted health conditions of the group before the policy experiment. One can see 
that the actual means in the first column are very close to the predicted means in 
the second. For example the first column shows that 89.27% of the selected popu- 
lation that use statins have a cholesterol disorder. The predicted population that 
uses statins and has a cholesterol disorder is 89.08%. The third column of the table 
shows means of the additional users added to the group. The health conditions of 
the group after costs are set to zero.  The third column shows the characteristics 
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of the consumers after costs are removed. For instance, the first row shows that 
70.08% of the 5 million consumers added in the expansion have a cholesterol disor- 
der. Comparing the second and third columns, there are a number of key difference 
between the groups that use these drugs before the policy experiment and after. 
One can also see that the fraction of individuals with cholesterol disorders is 19% 
less in the group of additional users after the experiment; however, the fraction of 
individuals with an atherosclerotic condition is 10% higher. One potential reason 
for this is that drugs that have been proven more effective at treating atherosclerotic 
conditions including Zocor and Pravachol are also more expensive. It may also de- 
pend, in part, on the joint distribution of health conditions and insurance coverage 
since these groups of consumers have distinctly different demographic profiles. As 
one might expect, the income and insurance coverage is less in the expanded group 
with doctors insurance coverage being 2% less, drug insurance coverage being 10% 
less, and average income of about $6, 000 less than in the before group. 
Focusing on the policy experiment that sets costs to zero I examine the 
determinants of substitution between products in the market. I find that removing 
costs as a factor changes the number of consumers purchasing each product, but 
not by a large amount. I find that Lipitor's shares are just 6% higher. The shares 
of the more expansive drugs, Pravachol and Zocor increase shares by 3% each. It 
is somewhat surprising that the generic version of Mevacor also increases, but it 
is more expensive than Lipitor and Lescol and it's market share is small so only a 
small increase is necessary to have a large impact on sales. 
1.8 Concluslon
The primary finding in this paper is that cost is an important factor determining 
the number of users of statin drugs in the United States. I find that lower income 
patients without prescription drug insurance are very price sensitive, they are less 
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likely to use drugs and, if they do use them, they tend to purchase the less expensive 
drugs. Insured patients are significantly less sensitive to price. 
The policy experiments in this paper quantify the impact of costs nationally 
and focus on the sample of consumers known to have cholesterol related problems 
in 2002.38 My estimates predict that over 500 thousand more consumers with 
cholesterol problems would take prescription drugs if they had a prescription drug 
plan. When I remove costs entirely (i.e. a cost of zero for all drugs), I find that the 
number of consumers without prescription drug insurance that would take statin 
medication if they were not facing the full price would increase by nearly 50%. If 
consumers with drug insurance no longer had to pay a co-payments or any portion 
of their prescription drug bill, I find that the number of insured consumers using 
statin medications would increase by about 30%. In total, I find that over 5 mil- 
lion consumers with cholesterol related problems in the United States do not take 
prescription drugs because of the cost. 
The types of consumers most impacted by cost factors have less drug and 
health insurance coverage, lower incomes, and a higher fraction of them have some 
type of atherosclerotic condition such as heart disease or a history of a stroke or 
heart attack. Although the impact of costs on the market are large, the magnitudes 
are not surprising when compared with studies examining compliance rates that find 
that only 30-40% of consumers prescribed statin drugs still take them after the first 
year. 
I also find that the drug products in the market differ substantially in the 
level of consumer surplus that they bring to the market. In 2002 I find the largest 
welfare gains from Lipitor, which are over twice the welfare gains brought by Zocor, 
the next highest selling drug in the market. Comparing welfare gains at the market 
price compared to gains at the generic drug price I find significant difference in 
3 8 Recall that 15% of the statin drug users are excluded from the estimates, so this sample of 
consumers represents approximately 85% of the consumers of statin drugs nationally. 
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consumer surplus under the two scenarios. This suggests significant welfare gains 
from drugs losing their patent. 
There are a number of interesting extensions to the current work. The cur- 
rent paper models persistence in consumer use through unobserved heterogneity, 
and ignores the possibility of state dependence in the market. It may be important 
to address possibility of state dependence in future work. The model also assumes 
that there is no product specific unobserved error which could potentially be corre- 
lated with price and introduce a bias in the current estimates. An important factor 
that is unobserved but may affect utility is advertising. There are strong market- 
ing efforts in the statin class of drugs directed toward consumers and doctors. In 
an extension to the current paper, I will look at how advertising directed toward 
consumers and doctors affects the overall market demand, and how it differentially 
affects people with and without insurance and various types of health conditions. 
1.9 Appendix 
1.9.1 Error Structure 
I begin this section by discussing the error structure of the model under the as- 
sumption that it is a cross-section, and then discuss the full error structure given 
the panel data set. The discussion and notation from this section borrows from 
Ben-Akiva, Bolduc and Walker (2001). The above model specifies a utility function 
that takes the form: 
uijt      aitpjt + xjtj3it + T ij + Eijt
I enter the T ij into the model using an error component framework. I specify 
unobserved component of the model as taking the following form for  T i  and  Eit
vectors of size Jt: 
T i + Eit       Ftr(it + Eit
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
t 
t T 
where Ft is a Jt x Mt matrix of factor loadings with values in the matrix taking on 
values of zero or one. The parameter r is a Mt x Mt matrix and (i is a Mt vector 
of normally distributed errors. The covariance of the JT vector of utilities uit takes 
the form: 
'L,    cov(uit)    Cov(T ij + Eij )    FtrrtF t + EitEit
The Eit are independent across choices and I normalize the variance of the 
extreme values to w2/6 which gives the usual logit specification. The covariance 
matrix is then: 
'L,     Cov(T ij + Eij )    FtrrtF t + w2/6iJ 







Lip 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 aBay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 aLe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 aM evG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 aM evB 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 aP ra 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 a 	  Zoc 	   0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 	  N D 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 aD 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 aLov




a a a D a a a a 
a a a a a a D a 
N D 
D D 0 + a 
D 
The variance-covariance matrix is then: 
'L,   
I 
a2 2 2 2 2 
\ 
2 2 2 
Lip + aD aD aD aD aD aD aD 0 
a2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 






2 2 2 2 2 
D D 
	  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
D aD aD aM evG + aLov + aD aD + aLov aD aD 0 
a2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
D aD aD aD + aLov aM evB + aD + aLov aD aD 0 
2 2 2 2 
D D D D 
a2 2 2 2 
2 2 
D P ra 
2 
+ a2 2 0 
2 2 2 
D aD aD aD aD aD aZoc + aD 0 







(7r2 /6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 (7r2 /6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 (7r2 /6) 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 (7r2 /6) 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 (7r2 /6) 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 (7r2 /6) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 (7r2 /6) 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (7r2 /6)
The first matrix is the covariance matrix of T i, and the second component is 
the covariance matrix of the logit errors (w2/6) iJ   . 
To extend the variance-covariance matrix to the panel setting is straightfor- 
ward, one simply uses the fact that Eijt are independent. If two periods are observed 
then the variance-covariance matrix is: 
I 
F rrtF t + (w2/6)iJ F rrtF t
\
F rrtF t F rrtF t + (w2/6)iJ 
1.9.2 Identification 
To keep matrices a reasonable size, I go through the proof of identification and 
normalization for a smaller version of the model. The smaller version examines 
identification in 1996 when there are only 4 products in the market. A similar proof 
follows when using the full variance-covariance matrix. I follow the steps described 
in [1] in checking that the parameters of the model are identified. 
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It is well known in discrete choice models that the level of utility has no 
effect on consumers decisions, so I begin by subtracting the utility matrix from 
choosing N o - drug in order to set the level of utility. I find that the "difference" 





a2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
\ 
2 2 2 
Les + aD + aN D + 2(7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6)
a2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
D + aN D + (7r  /6) aM evB + aD + aN D + 2(7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6)
a2  + a2 + (7r2 /6) a2  + a2 + (7r2 /6) a2 + a2 + a2 + 2(7r2 /6) a2  + a2 + (7r2 /6)
D N D 
a2 2 2 
D N D 
2 2 2 
P ra D N D 
2 2 2 
D N D 
2 2 2 2 
D + aN D + (7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6) aD + aN D + (7r  /6) aZoc + aD + aN D + 2(7r  /6) 
I then check the order and rank conditions of /:)'L,. The order condition states 
that the number of parameters that can be identified is equivalent to the number of 
cells in /:)'L, matrix minus one. This number is 15 and the number of parameters is 
is only 6, so this condition is satisfied. To check the rank condition I take a vector 
of all the unique components of the above covariance matrix and determine if the 
parameters  are  identified.  The  matrix  is 
I 
a2 2 2 2 
\
N D + aLe  + aD + 2(w /6) 
2 2 2 2 
 aN D + aM evB + aD + 2(w   
/6) 
2 2 2 2 
W   
 
 aN D + aP ra + aD + 2(w 
/6)
a2 2 2 2 
N D + aZoc + aD + 2(w /6) 
a2 2 2 
N D + aD + (w /6) 
Using the fact that the logit errors are independent across observations gives another 
set of unique components to the full variance covariance matrix that is not observed 
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1 0 0 0 1 1 2 
0 1 0 0 1 1 2 
0 0 1 0 1 1 2 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
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The jacobian matrix of unique elements corresponding to the above unique elements 

















The rank of the above matrix is 6, and the requirement to normalize one 
parameter for scale  implies that 5 parameters can  be identified.39 There  are 6 
parameters in the above model, so I normalize T iN D to a standard normal so a2 
1 and the 5 remaining parameters of the model can be identified. 
3 9 The logit variance is already normalized to K2/6). 
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can be used for atherosclerosis? no no yes yes yes yes 
can be used for myocardial infarction prophylaxis? yes no yes yes yes yes 
can be used for postmyocardial infarction? no no no no yes no 
can be used for stroke prophylaxis? no no no yes† yes yes 
1.10 Tables 
Table 1.1: Statin Drug Characteristics 
Usually Daily Avg. Drop in LDL per Avg. Drop in LDL 
Brand Name Dose* Avg. Daily Dose** per Max Dose** 
Mevacor 20 mg 24 40 
Mevacor (Generic) 20 mg 24 40 
Pravachol 20 mg 32 37 
Zocor 10 mg 30 47 
Lescol 20 mg 22 35 
Lipitor 10 mg 39 60 
Baycol 0.4 mg 34 42 
Notes: 
*The usual daily dose information and average drop in LDL cholesterol and MAX LDL drop were retreived from the drug label
**Usual Daily Dose specified in the Drug Facts & Comparisons handbook. 
Table 1.2: Conditions that the Following Drug Molecules are Indicated to Treat* 
Drug Comparisons Atorvastatin  Cerivastatin   Fluvastatin    Lovastatin    Pravastatin   Simvastatin 
(Lipitor) (Baycol) (Lescol) (Mevacor)    (Pravachol) (Zocor)  
Cholesterol Disorders 
can be used for hypercholesterolemia? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
can be used for hyperlipoproteinemia? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
can be used for hypertriglyceridemia? yes yes† yes no yes yes 
Atherosclerotic Conditions (e.g. Related to Heart 
Disease or stroke) 
Note: 
*This information is from:  Clinical Pharmacology Copyright 2005
†  indication not approved by the FDA
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Table 1.3:  User Shares* 
Drug 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Lipitor 15.7% 31.9% 37.9% 41.5% 44.1% 47.1% 
Baycol 2.0% 3.9% 5.2% 7.2% 
Lescol 14.5% 16.2% 10.8% 6.8% 4.8% 3.8% 4.8% 
Mevacor 22.6% 14.5% 7.8% 5.9% 5.8% 3.7% 1.6% 
Mevacor (Generic) 4.6% 
Pravacol 29.2% 21.7% 19.2% 17.4% 15.0% 12.7% 12.7% 
Zocor 33.8% 31.9% 28.2% 28.1% 27.8% 28.1% 29.3% 
Tot. Predicted # Users in 
Millions: 6.26 8.44 11 12.6 15.6 19 21.8 
Estimated % Annual Growth 
in Users • +34.82%   +30.33%   +14.55%   +23.81%   +21.79%   +14.74%
*User shares derived from MEPS data.  Use individual provided by MEPS to derive shares.
Table 1.4:  Condition Classifications 
Condition CCCODEX 
ICD • 9 
Codes 
Atherosclerotic  Condtions Acute myocardial infraction 410 
Other acute and subacute form of ischemic heart disease 411 
Old myocardial infarction 412 
Angina pectoris 413 
Other forms of chronic ischemic heart disease 414 
Occlusion and stenosis of precerebral arteries 433 
Occlusion of cerebral arteries 434 
Transcient cerebral ischemia 435 
Acue but ill•defined cerebrovascular disease 436 
Other and ill•defined cerebrovascular disease 437 
Atherosclerosis 440 
Arterial embolism and thrombosis 444 
Coronary atherosclerosis and other heart disease 101 
Other and ill•defined heart disease 104 
Congestive heart failure, nonhypertensive 108 
Acute cerebrovascular disease 109 
Late effects of cerebrovascular disease 113 
peripheral and visceral atherosclerosis 114 
Aortic and peripheral arterial embolism or thrombosis 116 
Cholesterol  Disorder Disorders of the lipoid metabolism 272 
Hypertension Essential  Hypertension 401 
Diabetes Diabetes 250 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 
Lipitor 41.46% 45.99% 46.94% 48.94% 
Pravachol 16.30% 14.43% 14.08% 14.36% 
Zocor 31.68% 30.83% 31.80% 32.80% 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Lipitor 41.34% 42.77% 48.56% 46.00% 
Pravachol 17.47% 16.14% 14.54% 15.85% 
Zocor 28.95% 29.16% 28.56% 32.80% 
















Table 1.5:  Comparison of IMS data and MEPS Revenue Share 
Comparision:  IMS Revenue Share & MEPS Revenue Share 
IMS Revenue Share 
Meps Revenue Share 
Error in Predicted Share 
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Table 1.6: Demographics • Age, Income and Sex 
25th 50th 75th 
Variable Mean Percentile  Percentile  Percentile 
Age 63 53 64 74 
Household Income ( $1996) $41,161 $14,162 $30,391 $55,800 
Log(Income  ($1996)/1000) 3.275 2.651 3.414 4.022 
Male (Male=1, Female=0) 0.477 
No Medical Insurance 0.034 
Medical Insurance & No Drug Insurance 0.290 
Medical Insurance & Drug Insurance 0.675 
CH (Cholesterol) 0.590 
HD (Atherosclerotic) 0.560 
DB (Diabetes) 0.236 










# Individuals 10,136 
# Individual Rounds 33,192 
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Table 1.7:  Probits 
# of Observations 33,192 
# of Individuals 10,136 
Probit R.E. Probit 















(4.38) (4.38) (3.72) (4.53) 
DrugIns 0.123 0.044 0.245 0.061 
(4.58) (4.58) (5.90) (6.12) 
Log(Inc) 0.059 0.021 0.068 0.018 
(5.46) (5.46) (4.14) (4.12) 
CH 1.426 0.452 2.607 0.551 
(40.61) (40.61) (39.42) (45.15) 
HD 0.269 0.096 0.432 0.110 
(8.52) (8.52) (7.72) (7.81) 
DB 0.037 0.013 0.095 0.025 
(1.37) (1.37) (1.99) (1.94) 
HYP 0.064 0.023 0.101 0.026 
(2.68) (2.68) (2.46) (2.46) 














male 0.140 0.050 0.255 0.067 
(5.95) (5.95) (6.18) (6.15) 













Table  1.8:  Conditional Logit (Without Random Coefficients) 
# of Observations 33,192 
# of Individuals 10,136 
variables Coef. Asy•Z Coef. Asy•Z 
Price •1.223 •(8.54) •1.207 •(8.42) 
Price*Drug Ins. 0.392 (5.28) 0.421 (5.66) 
Drug Ins.*Drug •0.503 •(3.48) •0.560 •(3.85) 
Price*log(Inc) 0.058 (8.59) 0.059 (8.75) 
Doctor Ins.*Drug 0.375 (4.63) 0.376 (4.65) 
Statin*CH 2.480 (54.83) 2.500 (40.63) 
Statin*HD 0.465 (12.37) 0.623 (12.89) 
Statin*age 0.020 (18.16) 0.020 (18.17) 
Statin*Male 0.259 (9.71) 0.258 (9.66) 
Statin*HYP 0.252 (8.03) 0.252 (8.02) 
Statin*DB 0.157 (4.97) 0.157 (4.96) 
Lipitor*HD •0.216 •(4.41) 
Baycol*HD •0.732 •(4.36) 
Lescol*HD •0.473 •(5.07) 
Mevacor (+Gen.)*HD •0.018 •(0.21) 
Pravachol*HD •0.189 •(2.94) 
Lipitor*CH 0.125 (1.78) 
Baycol*CH •0.565 •(2.61) 
Lescol*CH •0.360 •(2.91) 
Mevacor(+Gen.)*CH 0.096 (0.78) 
Pravachol*CH •0.236 •(2.73) 
Zocor •5.793 •(22.46) •5.896 •(22.58) 
Lipitor •4.699 •(19.09) •4.822 •(19.25) 
Mevacor •7.865 •(29.98) •8.040 •(28.12) 
Pravachol •6.359 •(23.51) •6.188 •(22.29) 
Lescol •7.597 •(39.65) •7.177 •(32.40) 
Baycol •7.319 •(34.54) •6.649 •(22.25) 
Mevacor (Generic) •8.135 •(31.75) •8.301 •(29.58) 
log(AgeMolecule) 1.103 (23.52) 1.090 (23.23) 
Log•likelihood •36,835.8 •36,791.6
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Table  1.9:  Mixed Logit 
# of Observations 33,192 
# of Individuals 10,136 













Med Ins.*Statin 0.627 (2.78) 
Statin*CH 5.777 (24.43) 
Statin*HD 1.326 (7.01) 
Statin*age 0.047 (13.07) 
Statin*Male 0.693 (7.53) 



























































Statin 1.589 (14.40) 
Lipitor 4.809 (33.40) 
Baycol 3.574 (9.62) 
Lescol 6.194 (18.95) 
Mevacor 5.075 (16.63) 
Mevacor (Generic) 3.033 (6.81) 
Pravachol 5.577 (24.82) 
Mevacor (Molecule) 0.241 (1.21) 






Table  1.10:   Insurance and Income Marginal Effects (2002) 
Change Pres Drug Change Doctors 
Insurance Insurance Income Elasticity 
Drug 10.07% 9.01% 0.026 
Lipitor 7.89% 9.68% 0.0212 
Lescol •11.84% 12.41% 0.0103 
Mevacor (Generic) 23.29% 23.11% 0.0509 
Mevacor 28.04% 15.59% 0.043 
Pravachol 22.98% 11.46% 0.0337 
Zocor 18.23% 12.42% 0.0322 
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Table 1.11:  Cross•Price Elasticity (2002) 
Market Cross•Price Elasticities 
Mevacor 
Lipitor Lescol (Generic)  Mevacor  Pravachol Zocor No Drug 
Lipitor •0.238 0.070 0.097 0.070 0.061 0.068 0.064 
Lescol 0.007 •0.254 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 
Mevacor (Generic) 0.010 0.013 •0.564 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.014 
Mevacor 0.009 0.011 0.019 •0.447 0.009 0.011 0.012 
Pravachol 0.022 0.026 0.040 0.028 •0.352 0.025 0.026 
Zocor 0.043 0.050 0.080 0.055 0.045 •0.337 0.050 
Cross Price Elasticities • Simulate Everyone having No Insurance 
Mevacor 
Lipitor Lescol (Generic)  Mevacor  Pravachol Zocor No Drug 
Lipitor •0.592 0.154 0.250 0.183 0.157 0.170 0.143 
Lescol 0.017 •0.564 0.032 0.023 0.019 0.020 0.019 
Mevacor (Generic) 0.023 0.027 •1.439 0.037 0.027 0.031 0.030 
Mevacor 0.020 0.022 0.043 •1.164 0.022 0.025 0.024 
Pravachol 0.051 0.054 0.096 0.068 •0.915 0.061 0.055 
Zocor 0.101 0.109 0.198 0.137 0.112 •0.866 0.108 
Cross Price Elasticities • Simulation Everyone having Insurance 
Mevacor 
Lipitor Lescol (Generic)  Mevacor  Pravachol Zocor No Drug 
Lipitor •0.111 0.032 0.049 0.036 0.031 0.034 0.030 
Lescol 0.003 •0.113 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Mevacor (Generic) 0.005 0.007 •0.281 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007 
Mevacor 0.005 0.006 0.010 •0.224 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Pravachol 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.015 •0.172 0.014 0.013 
Zocor 0.022 0.025 0.042 0.029 0.024 •0.162 0.025 
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Rep. In Population 
30,740,077 
Actual # Users: 1,847 15,746,264 
Pred. # Users: 1,824 15,358,263 
Per User Total Consumer Total Consumer Total Consumer 
Price in Surplus per User in Surplus to Surplus Surplus at Generic Surplus at Full 
Drug Name 2002 2002 Price Price Ratio (No Insurance) Price** Insurance*** 
Lipitor $2.01 2.57 1.28 $6,060,373 $7,225,370 $8,869,061 
Lescol $1.38 2.10 1.52 $795,558 $710,488 $899,481 
Mevacor (Generic) $2.07 1.20 0.58 $268,758 $401,913 $613,528 
Mevacor $2.30 1.67 0.72 $379,792 $577,209 $772,285 
Pravachol $2.35 2.12 0.90 $1,409,002 $2,012,533 $2,510,747 
Zocor $2.20 2.02 0.92 $2,616,577 $3,598,817 $4,623,923 
*All estimates in 1996 $s. Total consumer surplus calculations in thousands of dollars
**I assume a generic price of a $1.15 based on a 2004 average wholesale price of generic Mevacor in 1996$ 
***Full insurance implies a zero price 
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Table 1.13:  Average Statistics on Selected Populations Before and After Full Insurance Experiment 
In Sample Rep. In Population 
Sample Size: 3759 30,740,077 
# Drug Uninsured 1089 8,847,364 
# Drug Insured 2670 21,892,713 
Actual # Drug Unins. Users: 485 4,086,135 
Pred. #  Drug Unins. Users: 471 3,928,966 
Actual # Drug Ins. Users: 1362 11,660,129 
Pred. # Drug Ins. Users: 1353 11,429,298 






1. Typical Insurance 9.76% 506,778 
2. 15 % Drop in Price 5.80% 301,295 
3. 30 % Drop in Price 11.65% 605,092 
4. Full Insurance (No Cost) 48.67% 1,912,341 
Drug Insured 
4. Full Insurance (No Cost) 30.35% 3,468,321 
Market Total 
4. Full Insurance (No Cost) 35.03% 5,380,662 
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Cholesterol 89.27% 89.08% 70.08% 
Athero. Disorder 34.90% 36.16% 44.56% 
Diabetes 22.96% 23.68% 21.51% 
Hypertension 54.05% 54.69% 50.07% 
Drug Ins 74.05% 74.42% 64.46% 
Health Ins 98.39% 98.35% 96.78% 
Income $50,408 $49,535 $43,501 
Age 62.9 62.6 62.9 
Male 53.49% 54.34% 49.00% 
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Chapter 2 
Decomposing the Expansion 
Effects of Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1997 the Food and Drug Administration changed the required content of prescrip- 
tion drug television advertisements which effectively lowered the cost of advertising.1
Since the regulation change there has been a tremendous increase in advertising for 
pharmaceutical drugs directed toward consumers. From 1996 to 2002 expenditure 
on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) increased 600%, reaching over 2.5 billion 
dollars in total expenditures by 2002. Recent empirical evidence has linked this 
growth in DTCA to market expansion in demand for several classes of drugs. How- 
ever, little is known about how the responsiveness of DTCA varies across individuals 
in the market.  This paper examines:  Who is responding to advertising? What type 
1 The rule change reduced the amount of information the companies were required to disclose 
in the ad. Now instead of a detailed listing of effectiveness, contradictions and side-effects of the 
drugs the ads only require "major statements" of the most important characteristics. 
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of advertising are they responding to? and How they are responding? I attempt to 
answer these questions by estimating a dynamic demand model that explores the 
heterogeneous effects of DTCA on individual demand for anti-cholesterol drugs. 
Although this paper explores a variety of factors that may affect individual 
responsiveness, it primarily focuses on the impact DTCA has on two types of in- 
dividuals - those that have recently purchased (individuals on the medication) and 
those that have not (individuals off the medication). The effect of advertising on 
these two groups helps in understanding the incentives of firms to use DTCA. Since 
many drugs are used by individuals over a long period of time, current advertising 
can affect future demand through persistence in individual use. At one extreme, 
if only those not on medication respond to DTCA and there is strong persistence 
in use, firms will have an incentive to advertise early to get people started on the 
medication. At another extreme, if only those on medication respond to DTCA 
then there is greater incentive to use advertising only after the population of indi- 
viduals using the drug grows. Estimates from this paper account for the dynamic 
component of the individual purchase decisions and provide an important first step 
in calculating the optimal supply of DTCA. 
Another reason to study the response to DTCA for those that recently pur- 
chased and those that have not is that the effect on these populations provide some 
clues about the nature of DTCA. If those on the medication are fully informed 
by doctors and pharmacists and advertising is solely informative, then additional 
advertising should have no effect on these individuals. On the other hand, if ad- 
vertising does affect their decision to purchase this indicates that DTCA is not 
solely informative or that advertising continues to inform individuals even after be- 
ing treated.2      Compared to individuals taking the drug, those not on a drug may 
2 Ads may create a deeper understanding of the usefulness of the drugs, their side effects and 
remind people to take their medication. The ads may also persuade consumers, perhaps through 
dramatically instilling fear of future health risks. 
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have less contact with doctors and pharmacists so DTCA may be a more important 
source of information. 
This paper contributes to the recent literature examining the effects of DTCA 
by exploring the heterogenous effects of DTCA on market expansion. I focus on 
the statin class of anti-cholesterol drugs because the DTCA expenditures in this 
class are among the largest with over 200 million spent in 2002. In addition, the 
large expenditures on advertising were accompanied by significant market expansion. 
From 1996 to 2002 the number of users of statin drugs increased approximately 244% 
from an estimated 6 million people purchasing a statin drug to 22 million.3 The 
dynamic component of demand may be important for the statin class because they 
are typically prescribed to be taken daily and indefinitely. However, it is unclear 
how important the dynamic effect is because there are no symptoms from having 
high cholesterol and several studies have found that patients often stop taking their 
cholesterol medication despite the health consequences.4
To identify the effects of DTCA I combine nationally representative panel 
data with monthly DTCA expenditure data. I aggregate over all products in the 
statin class and assume that individuals make the discrete choice of whether to 
start or stop taking a drug. The econometric model allows for the start/stop choice 
to depend on observable characteristics of the individual (e.g. health conditions, 
insurance coverage, the price of the drug, and DTCA), unobservable individual- 
specific characteristics, and the individual's past choice. I employ an approach 
proposed by Wooldridge (2004) to estimate the dynamic econometric model that 
separately identifies the effect of the consumer's past choice (state dependence) 
3 The estimates include any individual that purchased at least once sometime in the year, so it 
may overstate the actual number of users at one point in time. The estimate is based on calculations 
from the MEPS data discussed later in this paper. 
4 Studies have shown that approximately 50% of those that begin statin drug therapy  have 
stopped 6 months after treatment.NCEP (2001). The health consequences are serious because 
high cholesterol is a major contributor to the development of heart disease, the leading cause of 
death in the United States. 
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from unobserved characteristics of the consumer (unobserved heterogeneity). 
Limiting the individual's decision to a binary choice is a key simplifying 
assumption of the econometric model. This assumption contrasts with other papers 
that assume individuals choose between a larger set of products.5 There are two 
reasons to make this simplifying assumption. First, when an individual is being 
treated by a doctor the amount of control that she has over the drug choice is 
unclear since the doctor writes the prescription, so focusing on the binary decision 
may fit more closely with the decision that the patient actually makes. Second, 
modeling the binary choice is sufficient to examine the market expansion effects 
of DTCA and it is computationally simpler than a dynamic differentiated product 
model. The trade-off of this simplifying assumption is that I cannot structurally 
identify some important factors that may influence demand such as changes in the 
set of differentiated products available in the market or the characteristics of specific 
products that change over time. 
Estimates from this paper produce a number of interesting results. I find that 
DTCA has a positive effect on demand, but it is relatively more effective at bringing 
consumers into the market than retaining consumers that were on the medication. 
The overall short-term market elasticity of demand is 0.107, the elasticity for the 
population not on any drug is 0.159, and the elasticity for those on a drug is 0.086. 
I also find some dynamic effects from DTCA from persistence in consumer use. 
The market demand elasticity decline but remain positive for several months in the 
future. 
Further analysis shows some interesting heterogeneous effects from advertis- 
ing. I find that age, the price of the drug and income have no effect on individual 
responses to DTCA. However, I find that those without medical insurance, those 
that may be unaware of their health condition, and those with less education are 
5 E.g.  Chapter 1 of this dissertation examining the decision to take a drug or not, and if so, 
which drug to take. 
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more responsive to DTCA. To the extent one may consider these groups less in- 
formed, these results are consistent with DTCA having the greatest impact on the 
least informed populations. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the current 
literature. The following section discusses some features of the market for cholesterol 
drugs and direct-to-consumer advertising. I then specify the econometric model and 
the approach taken to identify DTCA. Subsequently, I describes the data used in 
the estimation.   In the final two sections I provide results and conclude. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Much of the literature examining the demand effects of DTCA has centered around 
measuring the expansion effects versus the business stealing effects of advertising. 
Market expansion effects are generally considered to be welfare enhancing as indi- 
viduals learn about new treatment options. However, there are often concerns over 
business stealing effects that could unnecessarily lead consumers to purchase overly 
expensive and potentially less effective drugs than they are currently taking. The 
current literature has generally shown that there are market expanding effects of 
DTCA, but limited business stealing effects (See Ling and Berndt (2002), Donohue 
and Berndt (2004), Narayanan et al (2004), Wosinska (2002), and Iizuka and Jin 
(2005b). Also see Berndt (2005) for a more complete review of this literature). 
The focus of this paper is on the market expansion effect of advertising and the 
remainder of this literature review looks at papers that provide measurements of 
these effects. 
A number of studies measuring the market expansion effects from advertising 
use aggregate data. One of the earlier studies on DTCA looking at the statin drug 
market is Calfee et al (2002). They estimate demand for the statin drug class using 
aggregate data from 1995-2000.    They find that DTCA did not directly increase 
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total market demand, but found some evidence that television advertising may be 
strengthening patient compliance. Rosenthal et al (2003) estimate the demand 
effects of advertising using monthly market share data from 1996 to 1999 across a 
number of different drug classes. They apply an AIDS demand model using an 
IV approach and find that DTCA has a significant effect on market expansion that 
spill over to all drugs within a class, but find no evidence of business stealing effects 
between drugs within a class. Iizuka and Jin (2005a) measure market expansion by 
looking at the impact of DTCA on doctor visits in the U.S. using visit information 
from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) and monthly DTCA 
data. They observe the aggregate visit information by condition and match this 
DTCA data for drug classes that treat the condition. They find that DTCA has a 
significant effect on visits to the doctor in the U.S. In addition, they disaggregate 
the visit information to aggregate number of visits for different subpopulations. 
Their key findings on the heterogeneous effects of DTCA for these subpopulations 
are that those with HMO insurance are less responsive than Non-HMO individuals, 
and that elderly respond less to DTCA; but they do not find statistically significant 
differences between any of these subpopulations. My paper builds on the above 
literature by providing national estimates of the market expansion effects of DTCA 
based on consumer level data. Estimates of market expansion at the consumer level 
are especially important for obtaining precise estimates of the heterogenous effects 
of DTCA. 
The literature using micro data that provide evidence of the expansion effects 
of advertising have used claims data. Donohue et al (2004) focus on the effects of 
advertising on two types of individuals. They look at individuals that have a 
condition and are deciding whether to take a drug, and the decision to complete 
treatment for those that have started. They separately analyze these two decisions 
for anti-depressant drugs using a logit model. The data used in their study includes 
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medical claims data combined with monthly advertising data. They find that those 
diagnosed in a period in which spending on DTCA was high were more likely to 
initiate therapy. In addition, they find that total class expenditures on DTCA have 
had a significant positive impact on completing treatment. Wosinska (2004) studies 
the effect of DTCA on compliance. Her data is claims information on privately 
insured individuals in California. She measures compliance using the number of 
noncompliant days in a month. She finds that compliance effects are small, they 
tend to spill over to other brands, and in certain instances, DTCA advertising may 
actually have a negative impact on compliance. This study adds to the studies 
using consumer level data by using nationally representative data and accounting 
for the dynamic effects of advertising on individual demand. Using nationally 
representative data may be especially important for the statin drug class because 
about half of the people that use statins are over the age of 65 and are covered by 
the public insurance program Medicare who may not be included in the claims data. 
The data used in this paper also allow me to look at the heterogeneous effects of 
DTCA that is not possible using claims data that typically has limited demographic 
information. 
2.3 Market For Cholesterol Drugs and DTCA 
From a firms perspective, the possible gains from DTCA in the cholesterol drug 
market are considerable because high cholesterol is a prevalent condition in the U.S. 
with an estimated 17% of individuals over the age of 20 classified as having high 
cholesterol.6   In addition, high cholesterol is perceived as undertreated by many 
in the medical community. Topel (2004) estimates that approximately 36 million 
people could benefit from using these drugs which is well below the number treated 
6 The statistic is reported in Health, United States (2005) High cholesterol is defined as serum 
cholesterol levels of 240 or higher. This statistic is a projection of the number of individuals that 






over the sample period. 
	  
Relative to other cholesterol drug treatments, the statin drug class has been 
particularly well positioned to gain from market expansion. Statins have been shown 
to be most effective at lowering cholesterol with fewer side effects than alternative 
drug therapies and they are typically the drug of first choice by physicians for the 
treatment of high cholesterol.7 For most of the sample period all the drugs in the 
statin class were under patent protection, so there were no generics competitors. 
As a result, the statin drugs have been relatively expensive with a price of around 
$700 for a years supply, suggesting the revenue gains from market expansion are 
considerable. 
As mentioned before, the statin drug class has grown significantly with the 
number of users increasing about 244% over the sample period. In addition, the 
statin drugs have been the top selling class in the U.S. during the period between 
1999 to the present with total revenues of $12.5 billion dollars in 2002. The drug 
products in the statin class that are in the market during the sample period include 
Pravachol, Zocor, Lescol, Lipitor, Baycol, Mevacor, and Generic Mevacor.8   In 2002, 
Lipitor and Zocor were the highest selling drugs in the world.9 
	  
Advertising expenditures on DTCA in this class have grown in step with 
the market, increasing about 298% from 59 million spent in 1996 to 175 million 
spent in 2002. The spending on DTCA was almost entirely for the three top sellers 
in the class Pravachol, Zocor, and Lipitor. These drugs accounted for 99.5% of 
expenditures in the class across all years. Zocor spent the most on advertising 
with approximately 374 million while Lipitor and Pravachol each spent about 220 
million. 
Another component to the marketing strategy of drug companies are the 
	  
7 See the drug therapy section of the NCEP (2001). 
8 Other drugs have entered the class since the end of my sample in 2002. 
9 From IMS health pharmaceutical sales estimates. 
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marketing expenditures directed toward doctors. This includes advertising to doc- 
tors using sales representatives (often called detailing) and providing free samples of 
the drug products. I do not have these data for the statin drug class, but market- 
ing toward doctors in general is about 70% of the advertising budget (See Berndt 
(2005)).10 Although marketing data directed toward doctors is not included in the 
current study, Rosenthal et al (2003) shows that detailing is much less effective at 
expanding the market relative to DTCA. The elasticity of drug class demand with 
respect to detailing is measured between 0.017 - 0.034 compared to DTCA which 
they found to be about 0.10. 
2.4 Analytical Model 
I model the start/stop decision of individuals by applying a dynamic discrete choice 
model of demand. The model includes observable information of the individual, 
DTCA data, and controls for other factors that may affect demand over time. Most 
importantly, the model captures the persistence in use by including information on 
the individual's previous purchase decision in the model.  Including the past choice 
is essential for measure the differential impact that DTCA has on those that have 
recently purchased and those that have not. However, placing the previous decision 
of the consumer in the model leads to a common problem faced in dynamic models 
- separately identifying the effect of the past decision of an individual (state depen- 
dence) from unobservable consumer specific factors affecting demand (unobserved 
heterogeneity). 
Including the individual's previous decision in the econometric model creates 
an initial conditions problem because I only observe a partial history of the indi- 
vidual decisions. This problem arises due to correlation between the initial choice 
observed in the data and the unobserved heterogeneity of the individual.    In the 
10 0 This excludes free samples whose costs are difficult to measure. 
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case of cholesterol drugs, it is likely that the first cholesterol check of the individual, 
which is unobserved in the data, will likely be correlated with all subsequent deci- 
sions regarding treatment, including the initial treatment decision observed in the 
data.11 This is a problem because the correlation between the unobserved factor 
and the initial choice can produce inconsistent estimates. To deal with the ini- 
tial conditions problem, I apply a simple dynamic model proposed from Wooldridge 
(2004) to control for remaining unobserved factors that may be correlated with the 
initial choice. In addition, I use detailed individual level information described later 
to reduce the number of unobserved factors that could potentially be correlated with 
the initial decision of the individual. 
2.4.1 Econometric Model 
This section formalizes the dynamic discrete-choice model described above. In- 
dividual i 's decision to purchasing a drug in period t is indicated by the binary 
variable yit that equals 1 if the individual purchases and 0 otherwise. Her deci- 
sion depends on the previous periods purchase decision yit-l. I allow the effects 
of DTCA for those on the medication (i.e. yit-l     1) and those off the medication 
(i.e.  yit-l      0) to differ.   For those on the medication (off the medication) they 
are affected by the variable DT CAOn  (DT CAOJ J ) and their response to advertising 
t t 
may vary in the population aOn (aOJ J ).  The common effect of factors for those on 
it it 
and off their medication enter the model through j3it, while differences in effects for 
those that are on their medication enter through pit. Finally, I assume that there is 
an unobserved components to a individual's decision that does not vary over time, 
ci  and another component that does, r=it. 
Given these components, a person on the medication uses the drug if: 
11 1 In the case where the inital decision is actually observed in the data, the initial conditions 
problem does not arise. Unfortunately I do not observe the initial choice decision of the consumer, 




it  DT CAt + j3it + pit + ci + r=it > 0 
and does not otherwise, and person off the medication uses the drug if: 
aOJ J OJ J
it DT CAt + j3it + ci + r=it > 0 
and does not otherwise.  These two expressions may be combined to describe 
the decisions of people on or off their medication: 
OJ J OJ J On On 
yit 1 ij ait DT CAt (1 - yit-l) + ait  DT CAt     (yit-l) + j3it + pit(yit-l) + ci + r=it  > 0 
yit 0 otherwise 
as: 
The observed factors that affect both types of individuals may be expressed 
j3it     j3Oxit + j3lMt
The decision to use a drug depends on the individual's characteristics xit and other 
market level factors affecting all individuals at time t denoted Mt. The difference 
in use for individuals on the drug may be expressed as: 
pit      pO + plP roductit-l + p2Mt
The difference in use for those on the medication may differs by a constant pO, the 
product purchased in the previous period P roductit, and the market characteristics 
Mt. I allow the responsiveness of individuals to advertising to vary in the population 
by allowing aOn (aOJ J ) to depend on individual characteristics.  So, for example, I it it 
may specify aOn     aO + alxit. 
68 
I make two distributional assumptions in the above model. First, conditional 
on ci, I assume that r=it is normally distributed which gives the usual probit probabil- 
ity of choosing to use a drug, if>(aOJ J DT CAOJ J (1 - yit 
	  
l) + aOnDT CAOn(yit 
	  
l) +
it t - it t - 
j3it + pit(yit-l) + ci).  Next, I integrate over the distribution of ci. 
Special considerations need to be made when choosing the distribution of 
ci. Because of the inital conditions problem a potential bias that may arise in 
the model if there is correlation between .ci and the initial choice made by the 
individual yiO. Instead of modeling the joint distribution of all of the individual's 
choices (yiO, yil, ..., yiT ) I follow Wooldridge (2004) and obtain the joint distribution 
of (yil, ..., yiT ) conditional on yiO and xi, where xi is the average of the individual 
characteristics over all time periods. In this model the density of ci depends on both 
yiO, xiand parameters r which is expressed as h(ciIyiO, xi, r). Given the density of 
ci the joint density of (yil, ..., yiT ) may be expressed as: 
j (yil, ..., yiT IyiO, xi, B) 
r00
-00 
j (yil, ..., yiT IyiO, zi, ci; j3)h(ciIyiO, xi; r) 
A convenient choice of density function for h(ciIyiO, xi; r) is N (rO + rlxi + 
r2yiO, aa) which implies that ci  rO + rlxi + r2yiO + ai where ai v; N (0, aa).  Given 
the above assumptions, an individual i chooses a drug in period t if 
aOJ J 
	   OJ J 	   On On
it DT CAt (1 - yit-l) + ait  DT CAt    (yit-l) + j3it + pit(yit-l) +rO+rlxi+r3yiO+ai+r=it  > 0 
This model simplifies to estimating a random coefficient probit model. 
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2.4.2 Identlficatlon 
The model identifies both short and long term effects of advertising. The short 
term effects of advertising are captured directly through the effects of advertising 
on use in the immediate period. These short term effects are identified through 
correlation between the individual's start/stop choices and variation in advertising 
over time The long term effects of advertising enter the model indirectly through 
persistence in consumer use. This assumes no direct, long term effects of advertising 
on individual demand, so an ad seen by an individual in 1996 does not directly affect 
her decision to purchase in 2001. 
Identification of the advertising variable may also raise some concern because 
it is choice variable of firms. A bias may arise if unobserved factors are correlated 
with the individual decisions to use a statin drug. For instance, Lipitor entered the 
market in 1997 which may change the perceived value of individuals seeking med- 
ication or doctors providing treatment and this may also be correlated with DTCA 
expenditures. A number of factors greatly reduce any potential bias from estimat- 
ing the effects of the advertising variable. First, I include a flexible trend variables 
that differentially affect those on and off medication and allows for the presence of 
unobserved market level factors that shift demand over time.  With the inclusion 
of the trend variables one can view the effects of direct-to-consumer advertising as 
being identified through "local" changes in advertising. Allowing these trends to 
differentially affect those on and off a drug accounts for other information sources 
that may also have different impacts on these individuals.12 Second, the model uses 
detailed microeconomic data including important health conditions of individuals as 
well as their past choices. This significantly reduces the likelihood that there will 
be a common unobserved component to demand across individuals. Finally, firms 
have less experience with DTCA relative to other choice variables such as price or 
12 2 E.g. A news story about the benefits of cholesterol drug treatment may have a different 
effect on those using the drug and those not using a drug in the same way as an advertisement. 
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advertising toward doctors, so firms may still be experimenting with this form of 
advertising over the sample. To the extent that firms experimentation is random 
over the period of study, the level of advertising by firms will be uncorrelated with 
other factors affecting mean utility. 
Since I do not observe the advertising exposure on the individual, it will 
not be possible to distinguish response to advertising from advertising exposure. 
Identifying an effect on a particular group may only reflect the television viewing 
habits of the different populations. In any case, understanding what populations 
are responding to advertising is still informative about how the ads may be used to 
target different populations of individuals. 
Finally, another effect of DTCA may be to raise the awareness of health 
problems. If advertising has an impact on consumer awareness, then the effects 
identified in this paper will be a lower bound for the full effect of DTCA. The results 
of one study suggest that this bias may be small for the treatment of high cholesterol. 
Weissman et al (2004) looks at the effect of of DTCA on diagnostic prevalence. They 
survey a national sample of 632 doctors that who record information on patients 
that initiate a discussion based on a drug advertisement. A new diagnosis was made 
in approximately 25% of these visits. However, for visits where the patient asks 
about cholesterol treatments only 3.2% of the visits resulted in a new diagnosis. 
One important caveat is that the study took place in 2001, near the end of the 
sample and after significant market growth in the cholesterol market, so it is not 
clear if this fraction would be higher in earlier years.13




I combine individual panel data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
with monthly DTCA expenditure information from TNS Media Intelligence/Competitive 
Media Reporting (CMR) for the period 1996-2002. The MEPS selects a random 
sample of households and surveys all individuals in a household. It follows the in- 
dividuals for two years, during which it records information on individuals over 5 
rounds, where each round is approximately 4-6 months.14 The data recorded in 
each round includes details on the individual's insurance, demographic character- 
istics, health condition, and medical expenditures. In the analysis that follows, I  
will define a period as a round.  The MEPS study supplements the survey data    
by contacting the individual's medical providers and pharmacies to obtain billing 
information.  For instance, if a patient reports purchasing Zocor from a specific 
pharmacy, the pharmacy is contacted to provide a payment history for all purchases 
of Zocor from the individual. Each year approximately 15,000 individuals enter the 
data so the data set is an overlapping panel. The MEPS includes out-of-pocket 
payment information for prescription drugs. For individuals that purchase drugs 
the payment information is observed so we know the price paid by the individual. 
Exact payment information is not observed for individuals that do not purchase 
prescription drugs. 
The MEPS also includes detailed condition information. Individuals are 
asked to write about their current medical condition and health history, including 
when their medical problems began. For each medical event (e.g., doctor visit or 
prescription drug purchase), individuals are asked  about  the  medical  conditions 
that gave rise to the event. Professional coders take the information provided by 
the individual and assign one of 5 digit ICD-9 codes (International Classification of 
14 4 Expenditures on prescription drugs are allocated to different years, so for rounds that fall into 
two different years, I am able to splits round into two distinct periods. 
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Disease Code, Ninth Revision) which describe the individual's medical condition. To 
protect the identity of individuals in the sample, the 5 digit ICD-9 code is aggregated 
into 3 digit ICD-9 codes.  The 5 digit ICD-9 codes are also aggregated into 260 
clinically meaningfully categories called using Clinical Classification Software.  In 
this paper, both the 3 digit ICD-9 codes and clinical classification codes are used to 
describe the individuals medical condition.  After reviewing risk factors mentioned 
in the ATP III report,  and with the help of Dr.   Rasmussen,  I classified the 3 
digit ICD-9 and clinical classification codes into the four categories:  cholesterol 
disorders, atherosclerotic conditions, diabetes and hypertension.   The only group 
requiring more than one code was atherosclerotic conditions. This grouping consists 
of various forms of heart disease, atherosclerosis, stroke or prior heart attacks.  All 
of the problems listed above are chronic conditions, so that once an individual is 
observed as having the condition, he is assumed to continue to have the condition.15
The DTCA data provides total monthly expenditure on advertising, includ- 
ing expenditures across various media outlets such as television, newspaper, maga- 
zines, radio and internet.   The expenditure data are adjusted to 1996 dollars using 
a monthly producer price index for advertising from the Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics. The data are adjusted so that the expenditures approximate the quantity of 
advertising. 
The direct-to-consumer advertising data are matched to the individual data 
based on drug names and dates. Each observation of the MEPS covers multiple 
months while the advertising data shows expenditures for a single month, so the 
mapping between individual data and the advertising expenditures data is not one- 
to-one.16 The next section describes the construction of the advertising variables 
and other key variables used in the analysis. 
15 5 All of these conditions are listed as priority conditions in the MEPS which means that 
the information on these conditions is recorded whether the individual has a medical condition or 
not. 





The dependent variable Drugit equals one if any amount of the drug is taken in 
the current period and zero otherwise.17 The variable P rev.Drugit is the previous 
value of the dependent variable for individual i (P rev.Drugit Drugit-l). To 
account for the initial conditions problem I also include the variable init.Drugit
which is a dummy variable indicating the initial drug choice of the individual made 
in the initial period 0 (init.Drugit       DrugiO). 
I construct a separate price variables for those on and off of a drug. For 
both types of individuals the unit of price used is the amount paid out-of-pocket for 
a single daily dose of a drug. I measure the daily dose as a single tablet of the drug, 
which is the dosage that is typically prescribed. For both types of individuals the 
actual price paid in the current period is not observed, so for each type I construct a 
proxy for price. The construct a different proxy variable for price for the two types 
of users. For individuals that are on the drug, the average price paid for a tablet 
of statin medication in the previous period is a good proxy for the price paid in the 
current period. The price variable is Drug P riceOn is calculated by dividing the 
total out-of-pocket expenditures on the drug in the previous period by the quantity 
of tablets purchased.18 Unfortunately I do not observe a similar proxy variable for 
those off the drug. Therefore, I construct the price variable Drug P riceOJ J as the 
average price paid for a tablet by averaging the price paid across individuals that I 
observe purchasing. I construct a different average price for those with and without 
drug insurance for each year in the data.19
I construct different advertising variables for those on and off the medication 
17 7 To account for stockpiling, I assume that the average daily dose for each drug is taken, and 
I divide the total quantity of dosages purchased by the average daily dose to determine the 
number of treatment days purchased.  If the number of doses exceed the number of days in a 
round, that dosage is carried to the following round. 
18 8 For example, if a consumer purchased 30 tablets of Lipitor and spent $5, the price  variable 
would be $5/30 tablets=16.7 cents per tablet. 

















that correspond to the time period in which individuals make their start/stop deci- 
sions. I illustrate the construction of these variables for period 2 shown in the figure 
below. The figure shows two hypothetical decision periods covering the duration 
from March 1999 to December 1999 along with monthly advertising expenditures 
that fall into each period.20 For an individual that was off the medication, their 
decision to start using will clearly appear in the second period.    The advertising 
variable for an individual that is not on medication, DT CAOJ J , is just a simple 
average over the second period, allowing for a one month lag in response time of the 
individual (i.e. Average of the months July 1999 to November 1999).21
DTCA and the Decision Period of the 
Consumer 
DTCA Expenditure Levels 
Period 1 Period 2 
Figure 2.1 
For individuals that purchased in period 1 and not in period 2, it is not clear 
if they actually stopped in period 1 or period 2. However, it is unlikely that the 
decision to stop was made later in period 2 because if this were the case we would 
20 0 I round the day of the period to the nearest month to determine the expenditure data applicable 
to a particular period. 
21 1 The lag accounts for the response time to schedule an appointment, be prescribed medication, 
and purcahse a drug. 
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likely see purchases earlier in that period. Therefore, the advertising variable for 
those on the medication is lagged to capture the importance of advertising in the 
previous period. I construct the advertising variable for those on the medication, 
DT CAOn, to reflect the timing of the stop decision by averaging advertising expen- 
ditures over a 6 month period starting 6 months prior to the end of period 2 (i.e. 
July 99-February 99). 
Although the advertising data is averaged across a number of months, the 
average varies across the individuals in the sample because the beginning and end 
dates of the periods are not the same across individuals. Therefore, there is con- 
siderable variation in the advertising variable in the population. 
A description of the remaining individual variables, trend variables and other 
control variables are discussed in a variable appendix at the end of the paper. 
2.5.2 Sample 
The sample used in this paper is inclusive of a large fraction of the individuals in 
the MEPS survey. The sample includes individuals that list a cholesterol condition 
and those that do not because awareness of one's own condition may vary in the 
population and some other combination of risk factors may cause indivduals to use 
a statin drug.22
A number of factors limit the number of observations used in this study. 
First, I exclude all individuals who are 30 or under because cholesterol levels tend 
to increase with age and cholesterol drugs are rarely taken by the population in 
this age group.23 Second, the first period of every individual is dropped from the 
analysis because I do not observe the choice made prior to the initial period in the 
sample. Finally, the data are adjusted so that all periods are greater than 2 months 
22 2 This sample constrasts with sample of only informed consumers studied in chapter 1 of this 
dissertation.  Other risk factors include diabtes, hypertension, age, family history and smoking. 
23 3 The data shows that only 0.08% of those between the ages of 20 and 30 purchase a statin drug. 
76 
in length. If I observe a period that is less than two months in length I combine the 
information from this period with an adjacent period for that individual.24 This 
last restriction ensures that an individual's decision to stop purchasing a drug is not 
mistaken for unobserved inventory or the individual forgetting to take the drug for 
a week.25 After selecting this sample, I observe a total of 59, 922 individuals with 
221, 120 observations.26
2.5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 shows the total monthly expenditures on DTCA for the statin class split 
into categories of expenditure devoted to television and non-television advertising 
(i.e. radio, newspapers and magazines).27    The table shows considerable growth in 
advertising and substantial variation in the level of advertising over this period that 
should help in identifying advertising effects. The figure also shows the change in 
the marketing mix after the FDA rule change. Before the rule change the fraction 
of DTCA dollars in the statin class devoted to television advertising was 13.0%, but 
after the rule change the fraction rose to 53.2%. 
The growth in the number of users in the market was considerable. Table 
2.1 shows the population of individuals over the age of 30 in the United States and 
the number of those individuals that use statin drugs. The average growth rate in 
the number of users over the period was a rapid 23%. In addition, the population of 
individuals that purchase a statin at least once was substantial relative to the total 
population, with approximately 13.4% of the population over the age of 30 using a 
24 4 If  there  are  two  adjacent  periods  I  combine  the  data  with  the  smaller  length  period.    
The update involves changing the dates of the sample period, adjusting the advertising variable, 
and accounting for the purchases made in the two periods. 
25 5 I chose two months because individuals typically purchase 30 day supplies of a drug and a 
two month window allows for an enitre months purchase to be missing without affecting the 
model. 
26 6 The population of consumers analyzed in the results section of this paper differs slightly from 
the sample analyzed in this section because the model includes lagged advertising expenditures and 
I do not observe the lagged advertising expenditures for some of the observations in 1996, these 
observations are excluded from the regression analysis. 
27 7 The advertising is adjusted to 1996 dollars using the PPI for overall media advertising. 
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drug at some point in 2002. 
The growth in the use of drugs consists of new users coming into the market 
and those on the medication continuing to use the drugs. I observe about 15, 000 
periods in which a drug is purchased. Of all purchases, about 75% of them consist 
of individuals that purchased in the previous period, and the remaining 25% are 
new users. Of those individuals that used a drug in the previous period about 80% 
of them use the drug in the following period and the remaining 20% do not. 
There are a variety of purchase patterns observed in the data. Table 2.2 shows 
the various patterns for the 6, 125 individuals observed purchasing statin drugs at 
some point in the data. The first column of the table describes the start/stop 
pattern observed, the second column shows the number that fall into that category, 
and the last column shows that categories fraction of the 6, 125 individuals. About 
31% of the sample are observed purchasing a statin drug in every period of the 
data and 27% are observed starting treatment and not stopping. These two groups 
represent the compliant population which make up a majority of the data. About 
22% of the sample consists of people that are observed taking the drug and then 
stopping. The remaining 20% of the sample consists of people who stop and restart 
or have multiple stops and starts. 
Table 2.3 shows some descriptive statistics for the main variables used to 
explain individual start/stop decisions.28 The average price faced by potential new 
users is higher on average than the price faced by previous users.  The variation 
in price measured using the standard deviation is much greater for the previous 
user than for the new user. This is due to the price variable for new users being 
calculated as an average over the population. 
Even though the advertising variables for those on and off medication are con- 
structed differently, the distributional properties of these variables are very similar. 
28 8 These data are not weighted by the population weights, so they are not nationally representa- 
tive. 
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For both variables there is considerable dispersion in the amount of advertising that 
individuals are exposed to in the data with a standard deviation in the advertising 
variable of nearly 5 million dollars. 
There are a few additional things to point out in table 2.3. First, it was 
noted before that a number of studies focus on privately insured individuals only, 
but we see here that a substantial fraction of the sample is not covered by health 
insurance (12.2%) and an even larger fraction is not covered by drug insurance 
(32.2%). Second, there is a sizable 8.9% of individuals reporting a cholesterol 
disorder. Those that report having either a cholesterol disorder or some other 
atherosclerotic disorder make up an even larger fraction of the data covering about 
13% of the sample.  Individuals with one of these two conditions make up 85% 
of the observed purchases of statin drugs. The remaining purchases are either by 
individuals with some other combination of risk factors or by individuals that are 
unaware of their condition. 
2.6 Main Results 
Before turning to the estimates of the full model and analyzing the heterogeneous 
effects of DTCA, I first separately analyze the population of individuals that were 
not on a medication in the previous period and those that were. These preliminary 
results allow for some additional robustness checks of these data. 
2.6.1 Population Not On Medication 
Table 2.4.1 shows probit regression for the population of individuals that were not 
on a medication.  The first column of table 2.4.1 shows the set of variables used 
in this analysis. For each set of estimates, the first column shows the coefficient 
values and the second shows the asy-z statistics.  Most of the estimates in model 
1 are as expected.   The effect of advertising is positive and statistically significant. 
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Individuals respond negative to price, those with health insurance are more likely 
to purchase prescription drugs and all the risk factors contribute positively and 
significantly to an individual purchasing a statin drug. 
A key problem with the first model is that one cannot separate the effect of 
advertising in the first model from a general trend in the market that may be caused 
by factors other than DTCA. The second model includes a single trend variable, 
and I find a significant and positive trend effect over time and the coefficient on 
advertising drops considerably. To allow for more flexibility in the market trend I 
include higher order polynomials of the trend value in the model. I find significant 
improvement in the fit of the model, and the statistical significance of the advertising 
variable increases. Throughout the remainder of the analysis I include a fifth order 
polynomial time trend.29
One may be concerned with lumping individuals that are deciding to start 
with individuals that are deciding whether to restart (i.e. An individual observed 
purchasing, stopping, and then restarting). It may be that one group is responding 
to advertising, while the other is not. To see if this is the case, I run the probit 
regression seperately for these two groups. I find that advertising has a significant 
and positive effect on both of these groups. 
2.6.2 Population On Medication 
Table 2.4.2 shows four probit regressions for individuals that recently purchased a 
statin drug.     The first three models included here are parallel to those in table 
2.4.1. First I exclude a trend, then add a single trend, and next a higher order 
polynomial trend. Qualitatively, the findings are identical to those in the last 
section, which leads me to the conclusion that including higher order polynomial 
29 9 The results are nearly identical if the model is estimated with either a 4th or 6th order 
poly- nomial  trend. 
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trend seems important for capturing the demand effects of DTCA.30 The signs 
and significance of many of the other variables are similar to the results from the 
previous model. One difference is that the price variable proxied for by the price 
paid by the individual in the previous period is very precisely estimated in this 
model and suggests that the past price may be a good proxy for the current price. 
Examining this population helps check for a potentially serious reporting 
bias that could influence the results of this paper. A reporting bias could arise if 
individuals are more likely to report a drug purchase on the survey because they 
see an ad reminding them to. This would cause an upward bias on the advertising 
coefficient because consumers would be more likely to report using the drug when 
expenditures are high. Although the MEPS also surveys the individual's pharmacy 
to limit this type of bias, it does not ensure that the bias is nonexistent. 
One way to check for a reporting bias is to look at how current advertising 
affects demand for those on medication. As discussed in the variables section above, 
there is good reason to believe that current advertising may have less of an effect 
on those that are on medication because if they decide to stop taking a drug, the 
advertising (or lack of advertising) influencing this decision is likely to occur in the 
previous period or early in the current period. However, if there is a reporting bias 
present then there may be a stronger correlation between advertising in the current 
period and the individual reporting a purchase. Model 4 shows a probit using the 
same current advertising variable as is used for those not on a drug. I find that the 
advertising variable lacks statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient 
also suggests economic insignificance, which provides some additional evidence that 
this type of reporting bias is not present in these data.31
30 0 Similar to the previous analysis, excluding a trend I find advertising to have a positive 
and significant effect on demand; with a single trend significance falls considerable and the trend 
is increasing; adding a more flexible polynomial trend I find advertising is again positive and 
statis- tically significant. Also similar to the previous analysis this result is robust to the order of 
the polynomial trend.   Both 4th and 6th order polynomials give similar results. 
31 1 The result is the same with no trend variables.   I also get the same result when using current 
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I also use the population of those on medication to check for the appropriate 
number of months to lag the DTCA variable. Using this model I find that a six 
month lag works better than using fewer lags or adding additional lags and this 
is consistent with the assumption that individuals make their stop decision in the 
previous period or early in the current period.32
2.6.3 Full Model 
The main estimation results are shown in table 2.5. I begin by analyzing model 1 
from this table. I find that advertising has a significant and positive effect on both 
those on and off the drug. All the health conditions, age and sex are positive and 
highly significant. Health insurance has a positive effect and price negatively affects 
both types of individuals.33
Model 1 also indicates that there are dynamic effects in the drug choice 
decision of individuals because the coefficient on past use is highly significant. To 
evaluate the relative importance of past use, I calculate marginal effects for the 
average person that is on a drug. The marginal effect of purchasing a drug in the 
previous period is 32% (0.029). While this effect is important it is relatively less 
important than the whether the consumer indicates having a cholesterol problem 
which has a marginal effect of 73% (0.010). The effect of having an atherosclerotic 
disorder is also relatively large with a marginal effect of 17.3% (0.008). Therefore, 
state dependence seems to plays a role, but it is not necessarily more important 
than the individual's health conditions. 
Another interesting result in these estimates is the effect of price on individual 
advertising in the full model in the next section. 
32 2  However, one concern with using lagged advertising dollars is that they may only be 
affecting individuals that just started their medication, and not those that have been using the 
drug over multiple  periods.  To  check  this  I  run  a  the  probit  model  on  those  that  have 
purchased over two periods. The number of observations drop considerably along with the 
significance of the coefficient, but the magnitude of the coefficient remains nearly the same. 
33 3 I used a likelihood test to check for positive significance of past use in the second model because 
past use enters the second model nonlinearly. 
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demand. I focus the price effects for those that are on medication because the 
proxy variable for price seems closer to the true price faced by consumers. For 
those consumers that were on a drug, I find the price elasticity of demand is -0.026. 
This contrasts with the elasticity of demand found in the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment for overall drug expenditures of -0.27,(See Newhouse (1993)) and the 
typical range in the literature is between -0.20 to -.35. There are a number of 
explanations for this lower elasticity. First, an elasticity for expenditures does not 
correspond to an elasticity of use because one may shift expenditures while still 
taking medication by shifting to cheaper alternatives.34 Second, one could reduce 
quantity or stop the use of other drugs that may be viewed as less essential than 
cholesterol medication. 
The factors that enter the distribution of ci are also important. Estimates 
show that the inclusion of individual-specific random effect is highly significant with 
a random effect of 1.19 implying a correlation of p .59 (0.011) across periods. 
The inclusion of the initial choice is positive and highly significant. I also include 
mean health insurance as a component and find it to be highly significant, although 
it limits the models ability to identify the health insurance variable separately. 
Model 2 differs from model 1 by the inclusion of trend variables. Including 
the trend variables shift both the magnitude and the significance of the advertising 
coefficients, suggesting that these unobserved factors captured by the inclusion of 
the trend variable may be correlated with the advertising and may bias estimates 
of the advertising variables.35
Model 3 is included as a robustness check. It differs from the second model 
because it includes a number of additional terms entering ci as mean values of some 
34 4 E.g.  For statins, someone could shift from Zocor, a drug that is typically more expensive, 
to Baycol, a drug that is typically less expensive without stopping use.  Also, pill splitting is a 
common practice that often lowers expenditures. 
35 5 Alternatively, one must be careful in including trend variables because advertising is identified 
through variation over time. Therefore, multicollinearity with the trend variables may limit the 
models ability to identify advertising effects. 
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explanatory variables.. These variables include the mean of advertising, age, drug 
insurance, family income, and health insurance. I check to see if these variables 
capture any additional unobserved heterogeneity which may be important in pre- 
cisely identifying state dependence. The only value that appears significant at the 
95% level is mean health insurance, indicating that those that tend to have health 
insurance also tend to receive higher draws of ci. 
The mean advertising variable included in model 3 is an important check 
against a potential endogeneity problem that could arise from companies choos- 
ing when and where to advertise. Advertisers may be targeting individuals with 
particular values of ci, and if this were the case we may expect the mean level of 
advertising experienced by a individual to be correlated with use. Although the 
coefficient is positive it is not significant, and the other advertising variables change 
little when it is excluded from the model. For the remainder of the analysis I focus 
on the estimates from the second specification.36
Now I turn to analyzing the effects of DTCA on demand. I measure the 
effect of DTCA through market elasticities with respect to changes in advertising 
levels. To calculate these elasticities I first choose a single cross section of individuals 
from each year of the sample. I calculate market demand Q in each cross sections 
by applying population weights to the individuals in the sample. I compute the 




(Q(DT CA*l.l)-Q(DT CA)) 
Q(DT CA) 
.10 
There is also a dynamic effect from a change in advertising that acts through 
36 6 I perform a number of additional robustness checks on model 2. I estimate model 2 with both 
4th and 6th order polynomial trends and get similar results. Estimating the model with alternative 
functional forms on DTCA variables including log(DTCA) and DTCA interacted with the length 
of the time period. 
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state dependence in the model.  I analyze how this state dependence carries through 
to the following periods by looking at how a one period increase in DTCA affects 
market demand in subsequent periods. In other words, I introduce a dose of adver- 
tising in one period and follow that effect through time by calculating elasticities in 
the following periods. 
To calculate elasticities in the current and future periods I simulate purchase 
histories for 4 periods for every individual in the sample.     Over these 4 periods 
I hold all characteristics of the consumer and the market to be the same values as 
in the first period, and only allow the consumers choice and the state dependent 
variable to change in each of the following periods.  In each of the following periods 
I calculate an elasticity from a change in advertising in period 1. For example the 
elasticity for the following period would be: 
(Qt+1(DT CAt*l.l)-Qt+1(DT CA)) 
t+l Qt+1(DT CA) 
%/:)DT CAt .10 
I compute 200 simulated market elasticities based on Model 2 results.  Table 
2.6 shows the results from these calculations. Looking across the columns, I show 
the effect of advertising in the initial period's demand and the effect of advertising on 
demand in the following periods. The rows of the table show the group of individuals 
that I'm averaging over. For each period and each group of individuals I show 
the mean and standard deviation of the market elasticity across the 200 simulated 
elasticities The first three rows of Table 2.6 show the elasticity calculations overall, 
for those on the drug, and those not on a drug. The overall effect on market 
expansion in the first period is 0.107. This result is very similar to the expansion 
results found by Rosenthal et al (2003) that calculated an elasticity from DTCA of 
about 0.10 looking across multiple drugs. However, the static effect in period 1 is 
just a portion of the overall demand effect. I find that the demand effect in the 
second period is also significant with an elasticity of 0.021.   The demand effect in 
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the third period is nearly significant, but the economic magnitude is quite small. 
Comparing the effects for individuals that are on and off the drug, I find that 
the elasticity of advertising for individuals not on a drug is higher in the current 
period compared to later periods.   In period 1 the market elasticity for those not on 
a drug is 0.158, and the elasticity is 0.086 for individuals that purchased a drug in the 
last period. Below these results the table shows the overall elasticity in each period 
calculated for each year. The individual year estimates are less precisely estimated 
than the overall calculations, but they show a pattern similar to the overall demand 
effect. 
I also computed these elasticities based on model 1 estimates which are shown 
at the bottom of table 2.6. In these results I find the overall elasticity in period 1 to 
be about 0.109, the elasticity for consumers not on a drug is 0.24, and the elasticity 
for those on a drug is 0.04. I found a similar declining pattern in the effect over 
time. The overall effects are similar in both models, but relative to model 2, the 
results from model 1 seem to overstate the effects for consumers not on a drug and 
understate effects for consumer that are on a drug. 
The results from both model 2 and model 1 are qualitatively the same. The 
effect of DTCA seems to primarily affect those not on a drug, which is consistent 
with DTCA primarily being informative. The positive and significant effect on 
those that are on a drug suggests that either the DTCA is new information for these 
consumers, implying that the consumers are not fully informed orr that DTCA is 
somehow persuasive. 
While the dynamic effect is present, it does not appear large relative to the 
current effects. Therefore, there is some incentive for firms to advertise earlier rather 
than later because of the additional demand in the following period, but there is also 
incentive to continue advertising after the initial period. The importance of health 
conditions on individual demand suggests that modeling the effect of advertising on 
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awareness may be important. Morever, if consumers remain aware of their health 
condition in the future, an affect on consumer awareness could have a lasting impact 
on prescription drug use and which is not captured in these estimates. 
2.6.4   Other Heterogenous Factors 
This section analyzes other factors that may cause heterogeneous responses to 
DTCA. I analyze the different effects based on characteristics of the individual, 
effects of the FDA rule change and consumer responses to different product adver- 
tisements. 
The effects of the FDA rule change and television advertising may be difficult 
to identify with the current model because they are identified through variation in 
advertising over time. With only 7 years of data and for one product class it may be 
difficult to separately identify additional factors affecting responsiveness to DTCA 
over time.   These results should be viewed as preliminary. 
This identification problem is not as serious when looking at effects of ad- 
vertising on different types of individuals because individual characteristics vary in 
the cross section of the data. Identification of these effects are based on individuals 
with different characteristics responding differently or similarly to the same levels 
of advertising. 
Individual Heterogeneity 
I estimate alternative models to see if I can capture other heterogeneous effects of 
DTCA for different types of consumers. Table 2.7 shows just the coefficients on 
DTCA and interactions with DTCA with individual characteristics. In the first 
model I combine the DTCA variables into one variable37 and interact it with the 
individual characteristics, essentially restricting the effect of DTCA to be the same 
37 7 DT CAit = DT CAit   + DT CAOf f . 
it 
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for those on and off the medication. The variables that I interact are medical 
insurance, price of the drug, age, cholesterol disorder, education and income.38 I 
interpret the interaction with the cholesterol disorder variable as an indicator of both 
a condition, but also as an indicator of the individual's awareness of her condition. 
Since doctors prescribe medicines for their patients, it may be the case that patients 
are not always aware of why they may be taking a medication. 
The only variables that are statistically significant are education and choles- 
terol disorder, while the coefficient on medical insurance is nearly significant. If 
those with less education, those unaware of having a condition, and those without 
medical insurance are less informed populations then these results are also consistent 
with DTCA having an informative effect on consumer demand. 
The significant effect on education is particularly interesting as it lends sup- 
port to a theory by Michael Grossman (1972 a, b) relating demand, health and 
education. The theory is that better educated people are more efficient producers 
of health as they may know better how to use existing medical inputs. The full 
model results in table 2.5 showed a positive effect of education on use, but interacting 
education and DTCA in table 2.7 shows that the education variable is insignificant 
and that the effect of education with the interaction of DTCA is significant. This 
result implies that more educated individuals are less responsive to DTCA. The em- 
pirical result presented here is not a direct test of Grossman's theory, but it suggests 
that advertising is less likely to be new information for more educated individuals 
which is consistent with them being more knowledgeable about medical inputs. 
The second model in table 2.7 focuses more closely on the price of the drug 
and medical insurance. In this specification I allow for differential effects for those 
on and off the drug by interacting the different advertising variables with price and 
medical insurance.   These estimates show that individuals with medical insurance 
38 8 For the variables age, education and income I subtracted the median level in the  population 






are particularly responsive to advertising after they have purchased a drug. The 
fact that medical insurance has an effect on responsiveness to DTCA but price does 
not, provides additional support for DTCA being informative rather than changing 
consumer's willingness to pay for statin drugs. 
As mentioned previously, I do not observe the exposure rates to different 
populations, so instead of representing responsiveness to advertising, it may actually 
be picking up the TV viewing habits of these populations. This is an important 
caveat for the interpreting the results in this section. An alternative interpretation 
to the given results is that those with more education, health insurance, and those 
reporting cholesterol problems have less exposure to advertising. Evidence against 
the alternative interpretation is that one might also expect that income and age 




FDA Ruling & Media-Type Effects 
	  
Table 2.8 looks at the effects of television and non-television advertising expenditures 
as well as changes in the effects of DTCA after the FDA ruling. I construct television 
and non-television advertising variables that average the expenditure within each 
type of media over the relevant period. I find that television and non-television ad- 
vertising have similar coefficients for those that are not on a drug, but non-television 
advertising is statistically insignificant. I find that individuals that are on a drug 
respond more to non-television advertising. As suggested in Wosinska (2004) the 
side effects mentioned in television advertisements may be more noticeable than side 
effects listed in small print in newspaper and magazine advertising, and this could 
explain the relative effectiveness of print advertising versus television advertising at 
keeping consumers in the market. 
Next, I construct an FDA rule change variable which is an indicator of 1 
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if the individual's period begins after the FDA rule change. I find that the FDA 
change had a statistically insignificant effect on both types of individuals. Although 
the result show a negative effect of the rule change for those not on a drug, overall 
I found this result quite sensitive to the time period I select as the starting point of 
the FDA rule change. The estimates sensitivity may be due to confounding effects 
from changes in the FDA ruling, Lipitor's entry, and simultaneous shifts in the type 
of advertising used. 
Product Effects 
Table 2.9 examines how advertising of specific product affects individual responsive- 
ness to demand. In particular, how individuals that are on medication respond to 
the advertising of the product they are taking compared to the advertising for other 
products. Since this is not a differentiated product demand model I cannot tell 
whether individuals are switching brands as a result of the advertising, but I can 
see if they continue purchasing some product in the statin class. I decompose the 
advertising expenditure for those that are on medication into expenditures that are 
on one's own product and on other products. Model 1 shows the effects are positive 
and significant for both own and other product advertising. Using a Wald test, I 
cannot reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are the same. 
I look at how advertisements for particular products affect individuals that 
are using the product. I find that Zocor and Pravachol advertising has a positive 
and significant effect on customers purchasing a drug in the statin class, while Lip- 
itor's effect on its own customers is insignificant. This result could potentially be 
explained by the relative proportion of television and non-television advertising used 
by the different companies. Lipitor is the heaviest user of television advertising rel- 
ative to the other two companies, which may explain the smaller effect on retention 
for Lipitor users.   Wosinska (2004) finds a related result.   Wosinska (2004) finds 
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Lipitor advertising has a negative effect on compliance over some periods. She ar- 
gues that initial television advertising by Lipitor may have had a "shock" effect on a 
large number of individuals already taking the drug that learn about the side-effects 
of the drug for the first time.    However, her results are also preliminary. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the effects of DTCA on market expansion for anti-cholesterol 
drugs in the statin class. I find that higher DTCA expenditures are correlated with 
more individuals starting medication and fewer stopping. The elasticity of demand 
from an increase in DTCA is 0.107. I also found that the population of individuals 
on a drug was more responsive than the population not on any drug. The estimates 
also suggest a dynamic component to consumer demand with a 10% increasing in 
advertising in the current period causing a 0.2% increase in demand four months 
later. This paper also examines other heterogeneous factors that affect demand. I 
find that those with less education, those that are unaware of their health condition, 
and those without health insurance are more responsive to DTCA. The results from 
this paper are consistent with advertising having the greatest effect on populations 
that are typically thought of as being less informed about the need for prescription 
drugs. 
There are a number of important areas for future empirical and theoretical 
research. Empirically, an important effect of DTCA may be the effect of individuals 
discovering that they have a health condition. If the discovery effect is important 
this would suggest that my estimates are only a lower bound for the full effects of 
DTCA, and additional work on condition discovery is needed to capture the full 
effect of advertising. 
Another area of empirical research is to apply a differentiated product de- 
mand model that may help identify DTCA effects.   A differentiated product demand 
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model would help separate many factors that are actually observed in the data (i.e. 
products, market price and other characteristics), but assumed to be unobserved 
in the current model. This may be especially important for identifying the ex- 
pansion effects of particular product advertising and determining the effectiveness 
of television/non-television advertising that is difficult to identify solely through 
variation in advertising over time. 
Determining the optimal amount of DTCA is an important theoretical ques- 
tion for both firms perspective and policy makers. Firms may care when and how 
much advertising to use in order to maximize profitability. However, policy makers 
may want to know if the amount of DTCA being supplied in a competitive market 
is under or over the amount that is needed to optimize consumer welfare. The 
dynamic component of consumer demand in prescription drug markets makes this 
a challenging theoretical question. 
2.8 Data Appendix 
Individual i's state of health in period t is described by four dummy variables: CHit
for a cholesterol disorder, HDit for atherosclerotic conditions, DBit for diabetes, 
and HY Pit for hypertension. Since cholesterol levels tend to increase with age, 
and men are at a higher risk of heart disease at a younger age, I also include the 
variable Ageit  and an indicator for M alei.39    Individual i's family income in period 
t is measured in thousands of 1996 dollars is incit(000s). Finally, the individuals 
education is included in the model as the number of years of education, Educ. Y rsit. 
I use binary variables for insurance coverage. The variable M edinsit is equal 
to 1 if individual i has medical insurance in period t and zero otherwise. Medical 
insurance coverage typically covers doctor office visits and other services, which 
39 9 Although one might think of including race, current treatment guidelines specified in 
NCEP (2001) conclude that treatment should not change by race. 
92 
makes it more likely that insured individuals will obtain statin drugs and maintain 
treatment, even when they do not have prescription drug insurance. Individuals 
on private plans, Medicaid, Medicare, or other public insurance plans are classified 
as medically insured. I also include individuals with prescription drug insurance 
coverage because it is rare for individuals with drug insurance not to have medical 
insurance. I also distinguish between these insurance categories and the two large 
public health insurance programs in the U.S - Medicaid and Medicare. I include 
dummy variables for M edicaidit  and M edicareit. 
In some instances rather than use the constructed price described above, I 
use an indicator variable Druginsit that is equal to 1 if the individual i has drug 
insurance in period t and zero otherwise. An individual is classified as having pre- 
scription drug coverage if she has a private prescription drug insurance or is on 
Medicaid. This definition of drug coverage should account for nearly all individuals 
with drug insurance. According to Health, United States (2005) 40 , in 2002, 30% 
of drug expenditures in the United States are paid out-of-pocket, while private in- 
surance and Medicaid paid nearly all the remaining expenditures. Private insurers 
and Medicaid accounted for 48% and 18% of drug expenditures, respectively. The 
remaining 2% of expenditures were covered by Medicare. To account for the possi- 
bility of misreporting by consumers, I use prescription drug expenditure information 
provided by the MEPS to mark individuals as covered if a third party pays for a 
significant amount of their drug coverage for the year. I broaden the definition of 
those with prescription drug insurance by counting individuals as insured if their 
expenditures on prescription drugs are over $200 a year and over 70% of their ex- 
penditures are covered by another party.41 To check the validity of the prescription 
drug insurance variable, I looked at payments made by consumers in the sample. 
40 0 See table 119 
41 1 The $200 is total expenditures including statin drugs and all other types of drugs 
purchased for a given year. 
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The average person with private prescription drug coverage only pays 34.5% out- 
of-pocket, and the typical person on Medicaid pays approximately 31.5%. Using 
my definition of drug coverage, I find that those with prescription drug coverage 
pay 33.3% out-of-pocket, while those that have no prescription drug insurance pay 
84.9% out-of-pocket. The fact that people without coverage do not pay the full out- 
of-pocket price suggests that people are using alternative public sources of coverage 
such as neighborhood clinics or State programs. 
I use a trend variable T rendit which is a continuous measure of time in years 
or fraction of years between the end date of the period and 1/1/1996.42 I include 
both a linear trend and higher order polynomial values of the trend variable.   I also 
control for seasonal variation in the model by including a seasonal trend variable 
 easonit starting at 0 in the beginning of the year and ending at 1 at the end of 
the year.43 I control for the variation in the length of the period by include a 
time variable T imeit which is the number of days in the period measured in 30 day 
periods. The side-effects and other product specific characteristics of the drug taken 
by a consumer in the previous period may affect her choice in the following period. 
I use the following product dummy variables that are indicators of the drug choice in 
the previous period.: Lipitorit, Zocorit, P ravacholit, M evacorit, Gen.M evacorit, 
Lescolit.  In the above specifications Zocorit is left out. 
42 2 For example, for a period ending 7/1/1996 the variable would equal 0.5. 















































































2.9 Tables & Figures 
Table 2.1:  Market Expansion of Statin Drug Market 
Year 
Tot. Pop. Over Age 30 
(in Millions) 
Pop. Over 30 Used 
Statins (in Millions)* 
% Pop. Over 30 
Using Statins Growth Rate 
1996 148 6.4 4.3% • 
1997 151 8.4 5.6% 32.5% 
1998 152 11.0 7.2% 30.5% 
1999 155 12.8 8.3% 16.4% 
2000 156 15.9 10.2% 24.2% 
2001 161 19.2 11.9% 20.8% 
2002 164 21.9 13.4% 14.1% 
Notes: 
Number are estimated using the MEPS data. 
An individual is counted as using statins if they purchase once in the year. 











Table 2.2: Individual Purchasing Patterns 
# Individuals In Data: 59,922 






Always On Drug 1,901 31.04% 
Started Drug & Stayed On Drug 1,644 26.84% 
Was on Drug and Stopped 714 11.66% 
Started & Stopped 632 10.32% 
Stopped & Re•started 734 11.98% 
Other (Multiple Begin & Ends) 500 8.16% 
Table 2.3:   Summary Statistics 
# Individuals 59,922 
# Observations 221,120 
10th 90th 
Variable Mean percentile Median percentile SD 
Price New 1.05 0.63 0.88 1.90 0.56 
Price Prev. 1.14 0.05 0.58 3.10 1.18 
DTCA Off Med.* 10.33 4.69 9.57 16.40 4.99 
DTCA On Med.* 10.07 4.47 9.15 14.96 4.53 
Age 51.9 34 49 74 14.7 
Education (# Years) 12.3 8 12 16 3.4 
Family Income (000s)** $48.50 $9.78 $39.32 $96.86 $39.40 
Male 45.8% 
Medical Insuance 87.7% 
Drug Insurance 67.8% 
Medicare 24.0% 
Medicaid 9.3% 
CH (Cholesterol) 8.9% 
HD (Atherosclerotic) 8.4% 
DB (Diabetes) 8.3% 
HYP (Hypertension) 21.6% 
Time (30 Day Periods) 4.65 2.60 4.53 6.73 1.59 
* Deflated to 1996$s using monthly producer price index for advertising from the BLS
** Deflated to 1996$s using the CPI 
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Table 2.4.1:  Probits for those that were not on a drug 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z 
DTCA  Off 0.020 (9.72) 0.004 (1.65) 0.008  (2.60) 
Price Off •0.065 •(2.67) •0.094 •(3.83) •0.085 •(3.42)
Health Insurance 0.249 (4.46) 0.221 (3.93) 0.229  (4.10) 
Medicaid •0.025 •(0.68) •0.037 •(1.02) •0.031 •(0.84)
Medicare 0.059 (1.65) 0.077 (2.14) 0.076  (2.11) 
Family Income (000s) 0.000 (0.72) 0.000 (0.49) 0.000 (0.48) 
Education Years 0.008 (2.37) 0.008 (2.35) 0.008 (2.45) 
Age  0.101 (15.91)  0.102  (15.92) 0.102 (15.93) 
Age^2 •0.001    •(13.72)    •0.001    •(13.73)    •0.001    •(13.76)
CH 1.785 (81.34) 1.779 (80.79) 1.781 (80.71) 
HD 0.524 (18.27) 0.532 (18.40) 0.534 (18.45) 
DB 0.232 (8.05) 0.230 (7.94) 0.230 (7.95) 
HYP 0.164 (7.28) 0.161 (7.12) 0.161 (7.13) 
Male  0.056 (2.75) 0.054  (2.67) 0.054  (2.63) 
Day •0.360 •(0.82) •0.232 •(0.54) •0.283 •(0.66)
Day^2  2.018 (2.12) 1.588  (1.69) 1.630 (1.74) 
Day^3 •1.738 •(2.99) •1.472  •(2.55) •1.456 •(2.52)
Time  0.380 (3.21) 0.303  (2.55) 0.326 (2.73) 
Time^2 •0.056 •(2.48) •0.046  •(2.04) •0.049 •(2.16) 
Time^3  0.003 (2.26) 0.003  (1.99) 0.003  (2.08) 
Trend 0.063 (9.31) •1.181 •(1.42) 
Trend^2 0.845 (1.64) 
Trend^3 •0.241 •(1.66)
Trend^4 0.031 (1.61) 
Trend^5 •0.001 •(1.55)
Trend^6 
Constant •7.251    •(25.91)    •7.134    •(25.39)    •6.669    •(12.43)
Likelihood Function •11,191 •11,140 •11,131
# Individuals 57,245 57,245 57,245 
# Obs. 194,761 194,761 194,761 
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Table 2.4.2:  Probits for those that were on a drug 


















Price On •0.057 •(5.03) •0.057 •(5.05) •0.058 •(5.13) •0.058 •(5.12)
Health Insurance 0.336 (3.85) 0.335 (3.84) 0.330 (3.79) 0.331 (3.79) 
Medicaid •0.063 •(1.38) •0.063 •(1.38) •0.067 •(1.48) •0.066 •(1.45)
Medicare 0.001 (0.03) 0.002 (0.04) 0.005 (0.12) 0.005 (0.12) 
Family Income (000s) 0.001 (1.87) 0.001 (1.86) 0.001 (1.78) 0.001 (1.77) 
Education Years 0.010 (2.21) 0.010 (2.23) 0.010 (2.22) 0.010 (2.26) 
Age 0.039 (3.95) 0.040 (3.98) 0.039 (3.92) 0.039 (3.94) 
Age^2 0.000 •(3.60) 0.000 •(3.63) 0.000 •(3.58) 0.000 •(3.60) 
Had CH 0.194 (6.74) 0.194 (6.75) 0.193 (6.68) 0.192 (6.67) 
HD 0.116 (3.96) 0.116 (3.99) 0.117 (4.02) 0.117 (3.99) 
DB •0.016 •(0.51) •0.016 •(0.52) •0.016 •(0.50) •0.015 •(0.48)
HYP 0.149 (5.60) 0.148 (5.57) 0.150 (5.64) 0.149 (5.60) 
Male 0.048 (1.75) 0.047 (1.73) 0.050 (1.83) 0.051 (1.85) 
Day •1.826 •(2.97) •1.867 •(3.03) •2.073 •(3.35) •2.184 •(3.52)
Day^2 4.976 (3.62) 5.107 (3.69) 5.555 (4.00) 5.984 (4.30) 
Day^3 •3.241 •(3.81) •3.337 •(3.89) •3.653 •(4.23) •3.970 •(4.61)
Time 0.841 (5.17) 0.836 (5.13) 0.860 (5.23) 0.844 (5.13) 
Time^2 •0.130 •(3.94) •0.129 •(3.92) •0.135 •(4.06) •0.132 •(3.97)
Time^3 0.007 (3.23) 0.007 (3.22) 0.007 (3.36) 0.007 (3.29) 
Lipitor 0.092 (2.82) 0.089 (2.71) 0.097 (2.93) 0.097 (2.95) 
Baycol •0.230 •(3.03) •0.229 •(3.01) •0.188 •(2.44) •0.178 •(2.33)
Generic Mevacor 0.108 (0.76) 0.099 (0.70) 0.036 (0.25) 0.036 (0.25) 
Mevacor 0.037 (0.64) 0.043 (0.73) 0.039 (0.67) 0.038 (0.65) 
Pravachol 0.034 (0.86) 0.036 (0.89) 0.033 (0.83) 0.034 (0.84) 




































Likelihood Function •6,649 •6,648 •6,636 •6,639
# Individuals 5,544 5,544 5,544 5,544 
# Obs. 13,769 13,769 13,769 13,769 






Table 2.5: Main Results 
	  
	  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z 
	  
DTCA Off 0.025 (8.79) 0.014 (3.60) 0.012 (3.00) 
DTCA On 0.017 (3.82) 0.038 (5.01) 0.038 (4.95) 
Prev. Drug   0.880 (11.50) 4.707 (4.06) 4.688 (3.98) 
Price Off  •0.014 •(0.44) •0.045 •(1.41) •0.008 •(0.19) 
Price On •0.093 •(6.03) •0.097 •(6.26) •0.091 •(5.68) 
Health Insurance   0.124 (1.07) 0.099 (0.84)  0.110 (0.94) 
Medicaid  •0.015 •(0.33)  •0.030 •(0.64) •0.045 •(0.94) 
Medicare  0.044 (0.97)  0.063 (1.40)  0.073 (1.58) 
Family Income (000s) 0.000 (1.34) 0.000 (1.05) 0.000 (0.74) 
Education Years 0.008 (1.67) 0.008 (1.71) 0.008 (1.62) 
Age 0.154 (16.72)  0.156 (16.74)  0.197  (1.85) 
Age^2 •0.001   •(14.91)   •0.001   •(14.95)   •0.001  •(0.64) 
CH 2.358 (48.63) 2.362 (48.60) 2.382 (48.35) 
HD 0.711 (19.99) 0.725 (20.11) 0.731 (20.05) 
DB 0.315 (8.57) 0.313 (8.43) 0.313 (8.34) 
HYP 0.312 (10.55) 0.311 (10.45) 0.311 (10.33) 
Male 0.101 (3.59) 0.103 (3.62) 0.101 (3.52) 
mean(DTCA Exp) 0.014 (0.87) 
mean(Age) •0.040 •(0.38) 
mean(Age^2) •0.001 •(0.85) 
mean(Drug Ins) 0.085 (1.66) 
mean(Fam. Inc (000s)) 0.000 •(0.24) 
Mean(Health Insurance) 0.514 (3.70) 0.523 (3.74) 0.473 (3.25) 
Initial Condition 2.067 (35.38) 2.052 (35.21) 1.986 (16.29) 
	  
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Season Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Trends No Yes Yes 
	  
Constant •11.713  •(30.39)  •11.411  •(15.26)  •10.977  •(14.43) 
Random Effect 1.194 (40.27) 1.204 (40.48) 1.219 (40.60) 
Likelihood Function •17,747 •17,659 •17,638 
	  
# Individuals 59,525 59,525 59,525 
# Obs. 208,530 208,530 208,530 
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Table 2.6: Elasticities of Demand for Advertising in Period 1 
Overall Elasticity Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 


















Population Not On a Drug 0.1588 (0.032) 0.0259 (0.014) 0.0073 (0.007) 0.0027 (0.004) 
Population On a Drug 0.0857 (0.016) 0.0180 (0.007) 0.0038 (0.003) 0.0011 (0.002) 
Overall By YEAR 
1996 0.0581 (0.045) 0.0306 (0.032) 0.0163 (0.023) 0.0100 (0.018) 
1997 0.0815 (0.045) 0.0281 (0.025) 0.0099 (0.013) 0.0046 (0.009) 
1998 0.0866 (0.044) 0.0175 (0.021) 0.0029 (0.008) 0.0008 (0.004) 
1999 0.0593 (0.034) 0.0107 (0.014) 0.0029 (0.008) 0.0008 (0.004) 
2000 0.1089 (0.040) 0.0157 (0.015) 0.0030 (0.007) 0.0006 (0.003) 
2001 0.1561 (0.040) 0.0309 (0.018) 0.0083 (0.009) 0.0020 (0.004) 
2002 0.1379 (0.030) 0.0215 (0.012) 0.0043 (0.006) 0.0009 (0.003) 
Results Based On Model 1 Estimates 
Overall 0.1091 (0.015) 0.0196 (0.007) 0.0044 (0.003) 0.0010 (0.001) 
Population Not On a Drug 0.2459 (0.131) 0.0347 (0.040) 0.0080 (0.018) 0.0015 (0.008) 
Population On a Drug 0.0387 (0.010) 0.0084 (0.006) 0.0020 (0.003) 0.0005 (0.001) 
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Table 2.7:  Consumer Heterogeneous Effects 
(1) (2) 
Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z 
DTCA Off 0.038 (2.70) 0.035 (2.03) 
DTCA Off * Med. Ins •0.017 •(1.21)
DTCA Off * Price Off •0.004 •(0.63)
DTCA On 0.064 (4.07) 0.085 (3.03) 
DTCA On * Med. Ins •0.050 •(1.84)
DTCA On * Price On 0.001      (0.36) 
DTCA  * Med. Ins •0.019    •(1.53)
DTCA * Price •0.001 •(0.23)
DTCA * Age 0.000 (0.56)
DTCA * CH •0.009  •(1.84)
DTCA * Educ. Yrs. •0.002 •(2.03)
DTCA * Fam Inc. (000s) 0.000  •(0.13)
Med. Ins. * Prev. Drug 0.380      (1.10) 
Education Years  •0.029    •(0.62)    •0.030    •(0.63)
Medical Insurance  0.062      (1.37)      0.062      (1.38) 
Random Effect 1.205 (40.44) 1.203 (40.43) 
Likelihood Function •17,653 •17,656
# Individuals 59,525 59,525 
# Obs. 208,530 208,530 
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Table 2.8: TV & FDA Rule Change 
(1) (2) 
Coef. Asy. Z Coef. Asy. Z 
DTCA Off TV 0.014 (3.15) 
DTCA Off Non•TV 0.015 (1.10) 
DTCA On TV 0.029 (3.09) 
DTC On Non•TV 0.080 (3.06) 
DTCA Off 0.033 (2.29) 
DTCA Off *FDA Rule Chg. •0.017 •(1.33)
DTCA On  0.032 (2.33) 
DTCA On *FDA Rule Chg. 0.006 (0.52) 
Likelihood Function •17,657 •17,658
# Individuals 59,525 59,525 
# Obs. 208,530 208,530 












DTCA Own *Lipitor 
0.030 (2.75) 
0.011 (0.63) 
DTCA Own * Pravachol 0.045 (2.11) 
DTCA Own * Zocor 0.041 (2.43) 
Other DTCA 0.037 (4.63) 0.034 (4.14) 
Likelihood Function •17,653 •17,652
# Individuals 59,525 59,525 
# Obs. 208,530 208,530 
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Chapter 3 
Do Low-Quality Products Affect 
High-Quality Entry? 
Multiproduct Firms and 




From breakfast cereals to computers to airline flights there are many differentiated 
product industries in which firms offer multiple products in the same market. How- 
ever, there are relatively few empirical papers that examine the entry decision of 
1 I am grateful to Ken Hendricks and Randal Watson.  I would also like to thank Shane Carbon- 






multiproduct firms. This paper studies the effect of product ownership and quality 
on the decision to enter a market in the airline industry. The market considered 
in this paper is transportation services between two cities. I consider two types of 
products in the city pair market: nonstop service and one-stop service that stops 
in a hub before reaching the destination city. This paper empirically examines the 
decision of an airline to offer high quality nonstop service between cities given that 
the airline may be offering lower quality one-stop service. 
In this paper I consider nonstop and one-stop flights to be vertically differ- 
entiated services. The nonstop service is a higher quality than the one-stop service 
in terms of travel time. Several demand studies show that consumers prefer more 
direct flights.2 One-stop services also vary in quality. I proxy for the relative quality 
of the one-stop service using a measure of the directness of the one-stop flight. 
I will use a simple example and the diagram below to illustrate the type of 
strategic situation analyzed in this paper. 
2 For example, the demand study by Berry et al (1997) finds that passengers prefer direct flights 
relative to indirect flights.  Direct flight includes all nonstop flights and flights in which there is 
a stop but passengers do not change planes. An indirect flight is a flight in which a passenger 
changes planes. Borenstein (1989) finds that each on-plane stop implies a discount of 3 percent to 





Figure 3.1: Hub Competition 
Suppose we have just two airlines, X and Y .  Suppose that airline X has 
a hub at A and offers one-stop service in the B to C market through the hub. 
Airline Y does not have any service in the market. The entry game considered in 
this paper is the decision of airline X  and airline Y to enter the B to C market 
with nonstop service. I view the one-stop service as affecting nonstop entry through 
both cannibalization and business stealing effects. The business stealing effect is the 
effect that competing rival one-stop services have on the profits from the entering 
nonstop service. On the other hand, for airlines that own one-stop services, offering 
nonstop service cannibalizes demand for their existing service. Relative to airlines 
that have no services in the market, airlines that offer one-stop service have lower 
incremental profits from offering nonstop service. In the above example, airline Y 
considers the business stealing effect from competing with the one-stop service in 
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the market. Airline X considers cannibalization of its own one-stop service that acts 
as a disincentive for entering the market. One might expect that both cannibaliza- 
tion and business stealing effects to increase as the quality of one-stop service in 
the market increases. The model in this paper also considers competition between 
nonstop services. One might expect profits to decrease when rival airlines enter the 
market with nonstop service. 
This paper models nonstop entry of airlines as a noncooperative entry game, 
which allows for an economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The basic 
empirical approach of this paper closely follows Berry (1992) and uses a simulation 
estimator to recover the reduced-form incremental profit from offering a nonstop 
flight. The model differs from previous work in airline entry in two important ways. 
First, I focus on the nonstop entry decision while most other research aggregates 
across one-stop and nonstop entry. Reiss and Spiller (1989) find that the type of 
services in airline markets (i.e. number of firms offering direct flights or indirect 
flights) is an important determinant of the level of competition in the market, not 
just the number of airlines in the market. They argue that aggregating across service 
segments may lead to incorrect inference about the profitability from entering a 
market. A second important difference from previous empirical work is that I allow 
the ownership of one-stop service through a hub to affect the incremental profitability 
of airline entry. 
As theory would suggest I find evidence that both cannibalization and busi- 
ness stealing are important in shaping nonstop entry of airlines. I also find that the 
quality of the one-stop services in the market determines the size of the cannibal- 
ization and business stealing effects. Therefore, the ownership structure and quality 
of the one-stop services can impact the number of nonstop entrants. 
Examining the multiproduct entry decision in airline markets has become 
more relevant as many major network carriers began operating low-cost divisions in 
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the 1990s.3 The low-cost divisions of major carriers operating during the period of 
my sample include Metrojet (US Airways), Delta Express, Continental Express and 
United Shuttle. The low-cost divisions were started in an attempt by major carriers 
to cut costs and compete with Southwest and other low-cost carriers. This strategy 
has been called the "airline-within-an-airline" strategy because the operations of the 
low-cost divisions differ from those of the rest of the airline. The low-cost divisions 
cut back on passenger amenities and shifted emphasis from hub-and-spoke to point- 
to-point route strategies. In many cases this involved carriers expanding nonstop 
service to markets outside of their hubs. It is often the case that major network 
carriers offer nonstop service in markets in which it also operates one-stop service 
through a hub. Some examples of new entry of this type in 2000 include: In the 
Boston to Myrtle Beach market Delta offered both a nonstop flight and a one-stop 
flight through Atlanta. In the Las Vegas to Tulsa market Delta offered both nonstop 
service and one-stop service through Salt Lake City. In the Boston to Raleigh market 
US Airways offered a nonstop flight and a one-stop flight through Charlotte. 
The issues raised in some cases presented to the Department of Justice sug- 
gest that this paper may be of interest to policy makers. Several low-cost carriers 
complained to the Department of Justice because major network carriers began 
offering competing nonstop service in markets that are also served with one-stop 
service through a hub. A primary reason for these complaints was that it is rela- 
tively unusual for major network carriers to enter these types of markets. In 1995 
ValuJet complained when US Airways began offering competing nonstop service 
from Dulles to Boston and Dulles to Hartford. ValuJet argued that US Airways 
in the prior 10 years had not operated any service through Dulles that was not a 
major hub and that entry by US Air was anticompetitive. In 1996 Air South com- 
3 The major network carriers in my sample are American Airlines, Continental, Delta, United 
Airlines, US Airways, Northwest Airlines and TWA. I refer to these carriers as major "network" 
carriers to differentiate them from Southwest which is one of the larger carriers, but operates more 
like a low-cost carrier. 
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plained that Continental had attempted to overlay its new service in three markets: 
Charleston-Newark, Columbia-Newark, and Myrtle Beach-Newark. This paper pro- 
vides some insight into the types of markets in which an airline may choose to offer 
both one-stop and nonstop flights and why these routes may be offered. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the 
related literature in airline entry, Section 3 discusses the development and structure 
of airline networks, Section 4 discusses the data and variables used in the analysis, 
Section 5 discusses the econometric model, section 6 discusses the estimates and 
predictions of the model, and the final section concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
There are many studies that look at entry in the airline industry, but few of them 
incorporate a structural model of competition. Since many studies have found that 
competition is an important determinant of entry in airline markets, a structural 
model of entry should do a better job of predicting the behavior of airlines than 
a more naive model. In this section I review some of the structural airline entry 
papers. 
Reiss and Spiller (1989) model the competition between differentiated direct 
and indirect services. Direct service includes all nonstop flights and also includes 
all flights in which there is no change of planes. Indirect service means a passenger 
changes planes. They incorporate both entry and price competition in a structural 
model and examine how direct entry affects price competition in the indirect and 
direct service market. They find that the indirect service category is significantly 
more competitive if a direct competitor is also in the market. They also find that 
within a route there can be large differences in direct and indirect competition. This 
last point suggests that different service types should not be aggregated, adding sup- 
port to the approach taken in this paper.  There are two key differences between 
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Reiss and Spiller's work and this paper. First, the Reiss and Spiller paper only ex- 
amines markets with one or fewer direct entrants, while my paper considers markets 
in which there may be several airlines offering nonstop flights. Second, Reiss and 
Spiller assume carriers do not own both a direct and indirect flight in the same mar- 
ket, while this paper is explicitly interested in the effect of owning one-stop service 
on nonstop entry. 
Berry (1992) examines the role of market presence in both endpoint airports 
and its effect on entry. He aggregates across service types when defining entry, 
and allows for multiple entrants. He assumes that entry affects the profitability 
of all airlines symmetrically. This assumption implies that whether Southwest or 
American Airlines enters a market they have the same effect on the profitability of 
other airlines in the market such as Delta or Continental. However, Berry's model 
allows airlines to have both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in fixed costs. 
He finds that the heterogeneity in airline presence at both endpoint airports is an 
important determinant of entry. Berry also finds that his structural model of airline 
competition produces more realistic predictions of airline entry behavior than more 
simple entry models. 
Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) relax the assumption that entry affects the prof- 
itability of competing airlines symmetrically. Allowing asymmetric competitive ef- 
fects between airlines makes the model sufficiently flexible to allow for Southwest 
to compete differently with American than with Delta. In fact, their model allows 
for a very general profit function specification so that different carriers may have 
entirely different profit functions. They find that there is significant heterogeneity 
in competition between airlines. 
Although Ciliberto and Tamer capture an important aspect of airline het- 
erogeneity, similar to Berry they also aggregate across nonstop and one-stop service 
types. Because they aggregate across service types it is difficult to determine whether 
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the asymmetry in competition in their model arises because of the different service 
types being offered by different airlines, or if airlines actually price compete differ- 
ently with each other. One might expect that large network carriers like Delta and 
American that enter many markets with one-stop service have less of an impact on 
the profits of carriers like Southwest that enter many markets with nonstop service. 
In fact, in one of their specifications they find exactly this result. They find that 
American and Delta have limited effects on the profits of other carriers relative to 
Southwest. It is possible that service heterogeneity may be influencing their results. 
In my paper, I assume that there is symmetry in nonstop competition, but allow for 
asymmetry in competition between the types of services offered. 
The current paper is also related to the entry model of Mazzeo  (2002). 
Mazzeo examines a game of product differentiation and entry in motel markets. 
His model extends previous entry models by endogenizing product-type decisions 
(e.g. low-quality motel or high-quality motel). He then measures the effects of 
competition between the different product types. My paper also allows for different 
product-types to affect nonstop entry. However, I treat one product type as fixed, 
the one-stop service, and I examine the entry decision of offering nonstop service. 
One advantage of treating one-stop service as fixed is that I can examine continuous 
measures of product quality in the one-stop service affecting nonstop entry, while 
Mazzeo's model captures discrete differences in product quality. Justification for 
treating one-stop service as fixed is given in the next section of the paper. 
3.3 Hub-and-Spoke System and Airline Networks 
Before discussing the full model, it is important to have some understanding of the 
structure of airline networks. After deregulation of airlines in 1978, airlines quickly 
shifted to a hub-and-spoke system which remains the predominant structure in the 
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industry today.4 A hub-and-spoke system brings passengers from "spoke" cities 
into a "hub" city where passengers transfer planes and fly to destination "spoke" 
cities. There are both efficiency and strategic advantages for operating hub-and- 
spoke networks. 
The efficiency of the hub-and-spoke system has been thoroughly studied both 
empirically and theoretically. The hub-and-spoke system creates high density along 
spoke routes, which leads to lower costs per passenger. By channelling passen- 
gers into a hub, the hub network is able to generate greater density along all the 
spokes. Therefore, hubs allow for more efficient use of facilities and aircraft. Empir- 
ical studies by Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) and later Brueckner and 
Spiller (1994) estimate significant cost savings from economies of density, which sug- 
gest that this is a key factor motivating the restructuring of the industry following 
deregulation. Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992) examine the structure of the hub 
network directly and show that there is a relationship between higher traffic density 
across the network and lower fares. Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995) provide a 
formal theoretical model to explain economies of spoke density, and how hub-and- 
spoke networks arise from basic assumptions about cost savings from economies of 
density. 
Other reasons airlines form hub-and-spoke networks involve strategic advan- 
tages. Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1997) explain why it is generally a dominant 
strategy for hub airlines not to exit a hub-spoke market. They argue that the hub-
spoke market produces complementarities in flights that connect in the hub. A 
monopoly hub that faces competition from a regional carrier along a spoke can cred- 
ibly remain in the market under price competition because exiting a spoke causes 
losses in its complementary markets. This credible threat keeps potential entrants 
out of spoke markets. A hub carrier offering frequent flyer miles also has a strategic 
4 See Graham, Kaplan and Sibley (1983) for a description of key changes after regulation. 
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advantage. Passengers that use frequent flyer miles value the hub carrier's frequent 
flyer miles more than other carriers because the hub serves a greater variety of des- 
tinations.5 Hence, passengers that use frequent flyer plans may be more likely to 
choose the hub carrier. In the remainder of this paper I refer to the combined 
efficiency and strategic effects of airline networks as network effects. 
If the network effects are sufficiently large, then after a hub-and-spoke net- 
work is formed hub carriers will not find it profitable exit spoke routes. Therefore, 
nonstop routes out of a hub are essentially fixed. A fixed hub network implies that 
one-stop routes made through the hub are also fixed because passengers can typi- 
cally connect in a hub. An example using the figure 3.1 from the introduction helps 
to illustrate this point. Suppose there are 17 cities and 16 spoke routes connected di- 
rectly through hub city A. Assume that all connecting flights through A are offered. 
Now consider the marginal decision to offer nonstop service between two spoke cities 
B and C as shown by a dotted line in the above figure. The decision to serve the 
market between B and C with nonstop service is exogenous to the decision to serve 
the market B to C through the hub if the entry decision in the A to C and A to B 
markets is unaffected. Because A is a hub exiting a spoke market A to C or A to B 
implies exiting 15 connecting markets. 
To see that large hub-spoke networks are relatively fixed, I examine the entry 
and exit rates between all city pairs in a sample of the 50 largest cities. Table 3.1 in 
the appendix shows the number of nonstop entry and exits from the second quarter 
of 1996 to the second quarter of 2000. (The construction of the data and the sample 
will be explained in detail in the next section of the paper.) I find that entry and 
exit rates are much lower for hub carriers in their hub-and-spoke markets relative to 
entry and exit rates in markets where no carrier operates a hub.6     The hub carriers 
5 See Borenstein (1989) for a discussion of frequent flyer marketing strategy and empirical work 
on the effects of airport dominance. 
6 Exit (Entry) rates are computed as the fraction of carriers observed Entering (Exiting) from 
1996 to 2000 out of the total number of nonstop flights in 1996. 
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at their hub had an exit rate of 1.33 percent in their spoke markets, compared to an 
exit rate of 19.45 percent in nonhub markets in which no carrier operates a hub. The 
entry rate in hub markets is also much lower for hub carriers at their hub relative to 
entry rates in non-hub markets. The entry and exit rates provide strong evidence 
in support of treating hub markets as fixed. 
3.4 Data 
The primary data source used is the second quarter data from 2000 of the Official 
Airline Guide (OAG). The OAG data are a weekly schedule of all nonstop flights 
operated by domestic and international carriers. Each observation in the database 
represents a particular flight by a carrier in a quarter and includes information on 
the identities of the carrier, the origin and destination airports and the days of the 
week in which the flight operates. The OAG data are used to determine which 
carriers offer nonstop service. 
A secondary source is from the U.S. Department of Transportation's "Origin 
and Destination" survey. The Origin and Destination survey is a 10 percent random 
sample of all flight coupons by domestic carriers in the US. The data used are from 
the second quarter data from 2000 from the Data Bank 1A (DB1A). The DB1A data 
contains a list of fares and the number of passengers traveling on a route. Route 
information includes the origin and destination airports, the stops where passengers 
changed planes, and whether the trip was one-way or round-trip. It also includes 
the great circle distance of each route. To supplement the information from the 
above data sets I use 1999 MSA population estimates taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
I define nonstop service as a carrier offering 52 flights a quarter (approx 4 a 
week). To check the accuracy of the OAG data, I also require that I observe at least 
500 passengers (50 passengers in the 10 percent sample) flying directly between the 
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origin and destination cities in the DB1A sample. 
Using the DB1A data I chose the top 188 cities with the largest number 
of passenger enplanements in the second quarter of 2000. I then construct a data 
set that  includes all nonstop travel between 188 cities in the  second  quarter  of 
2000. I define a city as the MSA. Included in this sample are cities with multiple 
airports. For example, I count entry in the Portland to Oakland market the same 
as entry in the Portland to San Francisco market. There is clearly  a  trade-off 
between selecting a city pair as the relevant market rather than an airport pair. An 
argument for using airport pair markets is that business travelers often have a strong 
preference for flying out of major airports. This is the view taken in Ciliberto and 
Tamer (2004). However, by looking at the city pair market my estimates capture 
an important aspect of competition between major network carriers and low-cost 
carriers operating in secondary airports in the same city. For instance, Southwest 
operates out of Oakland in the San Fransisco bay area and competes with airlines 
flying out of the San Fransisco airport. Similarly, both Reiss and Spiller (1989) and 
Berry (1992) view airline markets as city pairs. 
I define an airline as having a hub in a city if the features of the airline 
network at that city satisfy two selection rules. First, using DB1A data, I select 
cities in which a single carrier transports more than 300,000 passengers that make a 
single connection through the hub to one of the 188 selected cities mentioned above. 
The first rule eliminates all but 20 possible hubs. The second rule requires that 30 
or more nonstop routes are offered out of the hub. Applying the second rule leaves 
18 selected hubs. These 18 hubs account for 81.4 percent of all one-stop traffic.7
To show that these selected hubs vary significantly from other airport op- 
	  
erations, I contrast characteristics of the selected hubs with the next 18 potential 
7 I calculate this statistic as (total number of indirect passengers changing plans at the air- 
port)/(tot passengers changing planes at the airport+total passengers originating from the air- 
port+total passengers destined for the airport) 
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hubs with the highest number of stopping passengers. The next 18 potential hubs 
account for only 12.5 percent of all one-stop traffic. Another characteristic in which 
the selected hubs differ from the next 18 is in the percent of the passengers using 
the hub that are changing planes. The average airport in one of the selected hubs 
has 44.14 percent of passengers changing planes, while the average airport in the 
next 18 potential hubs has only 14.6 percent of passengers changing planes. The 
types of carriers operating in the next 18 potential hubs are also distinct from those 
in the 18 selected hubs. Nine of the next 18 hubs are operated by Southwest, and 
four others are operated by other low-cost carriers. The other carriers in the group 
of the next 18 include United Airlines at San Francisco, Continental at New York , 
United Airlines at Los Angeles, and United Airlines at Washington DC. See table 
3.8 for a detailed list of the selected hubs and the next 18 potential hubs. Table 3.8 
also has additional information about the operations at each hub and is sorted by 
the number of stopping passengers. 
The next step in constructing the data is defining one-stop service through a 
hub. The networks of large airlines allow them to serve the same route in a number 
of different ways. For purposes of this paper, I am interested in the one-stop route 
that is the closest substitute with nonstop service. Therefore, I select the most 
direct route passing through a major hub. I use the nonstop entry information 
out of hubs and the location of the hubs to select the most direct one-stop flight 
through the network. To illustrate this construction, consider Continental Airline's 
Austin to New York market. In the data I observe that there is nonstop service 
from Continental's hub in Houston to both Austin and New York. Next, I examine 
whether this is the most direct one-stop flight that Continental offers through a 
hub. Although they have a hub in Cleveland, the one-stop flight through Houston 
is more direct. In this example I assume that the relevant service is the one-stop 
service being offered through the hub in Houston.8
8 I checked this example on Expedia on March 3, 2005, and found that Continental offered both 
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In defining one-stop service I exclude very low quality one-stop services of- 
fered through hubs. I determine criteria for what one-stop service may be considered 
"low-quality" by looking at the directness of one-stop flights that people typically 
fly as observed in the DB1A data. Typically I did not observe one-stop passengers 
on routes in which the distance is more than twice the distance as the crow flies be- 
tween two cities. Therefore, I do not consider an airline as offering one-stop service 
if the distance along the two segments of the one-stop service is more than twice 
twice the direct distance between the city pair. 
In selecting the subsample of city pair markets, I begin by following Berry 
(1992) by choosing all city pair combinations between the 50 most populated cities. 
The highest populated cities are used because these are most likely to have nonstop 
entry. An additional reason for using the 50 most populated cities is that the 
assumption of hub networks being fixed is more plausible in larger markets where 
the number of passengers in the network would diminish by a great amount if the 
market is exited.9 I then eliminate city pair markets based on two criteria. First, 
markets in which any carrier operates a major hub are eliminated. As argued before, 
because of the strong complementarities in hub markets, I treat nonstop entry out of 
hubs as fixed. It would be logically inconsistent to model the entry decision by hub 
carriers at their hubs while treating it as fixed in other markets. The second type of 
market that is eliminated are city pair markets for which the distance between the 
cities is less than 300 miles. These markets are eliminated because I want to focus 
on markets where nonstop and one-stop services are likely to compete. In short 
distance routes the closest substitute to nonstop entry may be car travel and not a 
one-stop flight. After applying these criteria I am left with 511 city pair markets. 
nonstop and one-stop service between Austin and New York where the one-stop service is offered 
through Houston. In constructing the one-stop routes, I do not use information on where passengers 
are observed traveling. The problem with using the observed routes taken by passengers is that it 
depends on the quality of the other services in the market and the pricing decision after entry. 
9 Recall that the entry and exit statistics used for arguing that hub networks are fixed were based 
on the 50 largest cities. 
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3.4.1 Variables 
The variables used in this paper include market variables and airline specific vari- 
ables. The market variables include both population and distance variables. The 
population variable is constructed from the 1999 U.S. Census Data measured as 
the geometric mean of the population in the two cities in millions.10 The distance 
variable is the great circle distance between the two cities in hundreds of miles.11
The airline specific variables capture the network effects of an airline and 
the characteristics of the one-stop services in the market. Although the larger hubs 
are removed from the sample, the network effects that are present in the remaining 
cities are still important determinants of entry. For example, Southwest has no major 
hubs, but it has a significant presence in a number of cities. To capture network 
effects I use the variable N etworkEj j ect which is the number of markets entered 
nonstop out of the two endpoint cities to the 188 cities in the large sample, but 
excluding the nonstop route on the city being considered. For, consider calculating 
the network variable for airline X deciding whether to enter the A to B market. 
First, I exclude the A to B entry and then look at the number of routes airline X 
has out of each city. Suppose they have 4 nonstop routes out of A and 5 nonstop 
routes out of B then the N etworkEj j ect variable is 4 + 5   9. 
The variable top is a dummy variable which is one if an airline offers a one- 
stop service through a hub and is equal to zero otherwise. This variable captures 
the cannibalization of an airlines existing service. The effect of this variable on 
the non-stop entry of a firm is expected to be negative. The variable OneOth top 
equals one if there is another airline in the market offering one-stop service. The 
variable N umOth top equals the number of rival airlines offering one-stop service 
10 0 In the A to B city pair market the population variable is P op =/
(P opulationinCityA/1million) * (P opulationinCityB/1million).        A   similar   measure   is 
used by Berry (1992) 
11 1 In the case where there are multiple airports in a city, I take the average distance 
between airports in the city. 
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in the market. 
I measure quality of the one-stop service as the total distance flown on the 
one-stop flight minus the great circle distance or distance as the crow flies between 
the two cities. For instance, the quality of the one-stop flight in the Austin to 
Portland market with a stop in Houston may be calculated taking the following 
steps: calculate the distance from Austin to Houston, add the distance from Houston 
to Portland, and then subtract the distance crow flying distance between Portland 
and Austin. I call this variable CircDist. A similar measure is used by Reiss and 
Spiller (1989) and Borenstein (1989).12 As this variable increases the quality of the 
one-stop service is lower. The variable OwnCircDist is the quality variable of an 
airline's own one-stop service in the market. If an airline does not have a one-stop 
product in the market then OwnCircDist equals zero. The variable RivalCircDist 
is the quality of the highest quality rival airline in the market. If no airline is in the 
market then RivalCircDist equals zero. 
The model in this paper estimates a game of competition between entrants. 
I consider an airline as a potential entrant in this model if the airline has some 
presence in both cities of the city pair market in the second quarter of 2000.13 This 
definition may be justified if one views nonstop entry as actually occurring in two 
stages: first airlines decide which cities they will enter, and second they decide which 
routes will be entered nonstop out of the city. The game analyzed in this paper takes 
the first stage of entry into a city as given and then analyzes the decision to enter 
nonstop in a particular city pair market. The reasons for using this definition of 
entry is that it focuses the entry game on the most likely set of entrants. This 
definition of a potential entrant differs from that used in Berry (1992) which defines 
12 2 One could argue that a more accurate measure of quality may be total time of a flight or 
some on-time performance measure at a hub. Although these measures may be a more accurate 
reflection of consumer preferences, it is not clear that these measure of quality are exogenous to 
competition. Mazzeo (2003) finds that the on-time performance of a carrier improves with increased 
competition in the market suggesting that on-time performance may be chosen by carriers. 
13 3 By "presence" I mean that there is are some passengers observed flying in or out of the city. 
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an airline as a potential entrant if they have some presence at either endpoint city. I 
find that this definition includes many firms as potential entrants that are not likely 
to enter. 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Before describing the full empirical model, I examine some descriptive tables that 
provide some insights into the determinants of nonstop entry. Table 3.2 tabulates 
descriptive statistics by the number of airlines offering nonstop service. The first 
column lists possible number of nonstop entrants and the second column shows the 
frequency in which that number of nonstop entrants are observed in the data. The 
frequencies show that in most of the markets in the sample there is no airline offering 
nonstop service. The third through sixth columns show the mean of the population 
variables, distance, number of one-stop services and the most direct one-stop service 
in the market. I find that distance is typically greater in markets in which no carrier 
offers nonstop service. This may reflect the success of low-cost carriers in entering 
short distance nonstop routes, as well as the efficiency of hubs in traveling longer 
distances. The table also shows that nonstop services increase with the population. 
In a markets with fewer nonstop entrants the highest quality one-stop service is 
greater. 
Table 3.3 shows the number of markets entered by each airline and the av- 
erage network effect for each airline. There are two points to note in this table. 
First, Southwest enters more markets than any other airline in the sample. This is 
not surprising given Southwest's strategy of avoiding direct competition with major 
hubs and their focus on entering markets with nonstop (i.e. point-to-point) service. 
Second, there is a strong association between the network effect variable and the 
number of markets a carrier enters with nonstop service. 




quality measure is listed in order of quality in the market. Note that the average 
circular distance of the most direct one-stop flight in the market is about 25 miles. 
This suggests that for most cities there is a major hub that offers fairly direct service. 
This may reflects the strategic placement of hubs in central locations in the country 
that can offer more direct service to more destinations. The average CircDist for 
the second highest quality firm is more than three times greater than the highest 
quality. 
3.5   Econometric Model of Entry 
I model airlines as playing a complete information entry game. At the beginning of 
the game, each potential entrant knows its own and its rivals' post-entry incremental 
profits. Incremental profits for offering nonstop service depend on existing one-stop 
services in the market through a hub, network features in the city pair, observed 
and unobserved demand and cost factors, and the number of rivals entering with a 
nonstop service. Given this information, airlines enter the market if their incremen- 
tal profits are positive, otherwise they do not enter. The econometric entry model 
in this paper is very similar to Berry (1992). The primary differences are that I 
focus on the nonstop entry and incorporate information on one-stop services. 
I assume the following functional form for incremental profits: 
ik (Ni)    xi j3M arket +xik j3N etwork +xik j3OS -bNi +aEi +
/
1 - a2Eik
w* M arket 
N etwork OneStop 
(3.1) 
The variables xi  are market specific variables capturing observed market specific 
demand and cost factors.  The variables xN etwork capture the network effects of 
firm k in market i. The variables xOneStop capture the influence of airline k's own 
one-stop service and the one-stop services of its rivals. I also allow for both market 
and firm specific portions of unobserved profits Ei  and Eik .  The parameters to be 
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estimated are j3M arket, j3N etwork , j3OneStop and a. The variable Ni is the number of 
airlines that enter in the city pair market, and is the dependent variable in the 
above model. I assume that additional entry causes profit loss to other airlines in 
the market so b   0.14
The number of airlines that enter in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium equals 
the maximum number of airlines that can profitably enter a market. Formally, the 
equilibrium number of airlines that enter in market i is: 
i max 
O<n<Ki 
{n : w* (n) > 0} (3.2) 
where Ki  is the number of potential entrants in market i.  The number of airlines 
that enter in equilibrium is unique. To see this, suppose it is not unique, then there 
is an equilibrium number of airlines Ni  / 
N *.  If Ni > N *  this implies that some
i i 
airline must be making negative profits, and if Ni < N * then there exists a airline 
that could profitably enter the market but chooses not to enter.15
The identity of entering airlines in an equilibrium of the above game is not 
unique. Consider the simple example of a market with two potential entrants that 
each find it profitable to enter as a monopolist, w* (1) > 0, but do not find it 
profitable to enter in a duopoly market w* (2) < 0. The above model implies that 
i       1, but it is unclear which of the two airlines enters. 
To use information on the identity of airlines I follow Berry by assuming that 
airlines enter in the order of post entry profitability. He justifies this selection by 
assuming that airlines are playing a post-entry war of attrition that would instantly 
eliminate less profitable airlines if more than N * enter as in Judd (1985). Under 
the "most-profitable firm enters first" selection rule, let i* be an indicator of entry 
by airline k in market i. The function i* is 1 if firm k in market i is one of the N * 
14 4 More flexible specifications of the above model suggested that the number of airlines that enter 
the market affects profits linearly. 






most profitable airlines in the market, and 0 otherwise. 
3.5.1   Method of Simulated Moments Estimator 
I estimate the above profit function using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) 
estimator (See McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989)).16 I estimate the 
model using a frequency simulator. I start by taking R simulation draws. For a 
given set of parameter values b and simulation draw r E (1...R) I evaluate the profit 
function for all potential airlines in the market and I solve for the Nash equilibrium 
number of firms in each market Nir (b). I also use the ordering assumption to deter- 
mine the identities of the Nir (b) firms in the market, where the entry prediction for 
market i for airline k and simulation draw r is iikr (b). 
An unbiased estimator of the number of airlines that enter market i is found 
by averaging over the predictions for each simulation draw.  That is, the predicted
number of airlines entering in market i is NAi(b)    l 
),R 	   Nir (b).  To obtain an
R r=l 
unbiased estimator of the entry of individual airlines, I average over the individual 
entry predictions for each carrier. The unbiased prediction of entering for airline k 
in market i is iAik (b)    l 
),R iikr (b).
R r=l 
Let the observed number of airlines entering in market i be N *, and let the 
observed entry decision of airline k in market i be i* . I specify the prediction 
error in the number of airlines for market i as ui(b)     N * - NAi(b).    I specify 
the prediction error in the identity of airline k in market i as uik (b)    i* - iAi(b). 
The number of potential entrants varies in each market. To keep the number of 
moment conditions the same across markets, I choose the two potential entrants in 
the market with the highest network effect variable.  The vector of prediction errors 
is then vi(b)      ui, uil, ui2. 
From these predictions errors I construct moments. Let j (Zi, Zil, Zi2) be an 
16 6 This section closely follows Berry (1992). 
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) )
L dimensional function of market its exogenous data Zi and the exogenous data 
for airline k be Zik .  Then given M markets and that vi(b) is uncorrelated with 
j (Zi, Zil, Zi2) implies 
g(b) 
1 
M vi(b) i 
j (Zi, Zil, Zi2) 
1 
M gi(b) i 
The value g(b) is a vector of size L and the true b satisfies E[g(b)] 0. The MSM- 
estimator Ab is defined as the minimizer of weighted distance between observed and 
simulated moments, such that, Ab solves 
arg min gt(b)ng(b) 
b 
where the n is a weight matrix. I estimate this model in two stages. In the first 
stage I set n equal to the identity matrix to get a consistent estimate of b. In 
the second stage I calculate the optimal weight matrix n E (g(b) gt(b)) by using 
estimates of b from the first stage and solve the above equation again to obtain my 
final estimates. I use simulated annealing to solve for the minimum of the objective 
function. 
I employ different instruments depending on the specification of the model. 
The instruments used are discussed along with the each specification in the next 
section. The standard errors are computed using the formula in Pakes and Pollard      -l (1989) where the asymptotic distribution of 
.J
M (Ab b) is 
(




)nE( Bg ) .   - R Bb Bb 
3.6    Estimates 
Before estimating the full model, it may be useful to analyze a simpler probit model 
that excludes competition from the analysis. Although the simple model excludes 
competition, it provides a basic approach to look at the impact of one-stop services 
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on nonstop entry. In addition, if competition with other nonstop entrants is not an 
important determinant of entry, then a simple probit model will accurately capture 
an airlines decision to enter a market. Table 3.5 shows two simple probit estimates of 
entry for all potential entrants in each market. Model 1 only includes an airline's own 
one-stop service, while model 2 includes features of both an airline's own one-stop 
service and the service of its rivals. Focusing on model 2, the probit estimate shows 
that ownership of a one-stop service reduces the probability of entry. This reflects 
cannibalization of an airline's own service. An increase in the circular distance 
of an airline's own one stop service increases the probability of entry. A reason for 
this is that cannibalization effects are reduced as the quality of one's own service are 
lower. If there is a one-stop rival in the market then the probability of entry declines 
which is consistent with the existence of business stealing effects. An increase in 
the circular distance of a rival airline's service increases the probability of entry 
suggesting that business stealing effects are less for lower quality one-stop service. 
For each additional one-stop entrant the probability of entering increases. This last 
result is not consistent with the view that competition is greater as the number 
of one-stop entrants increases.  Although the probit captures many of the effects 
of interest, it is difficult to know how important nonstop competition is between 
carriers until looking at estimates from the full model. 
Now I look at three specifications of the structural model that incorporates 
competition with other nonstop entrants. These estimates are shown in table 3.6. 
The first model is a benchmark model that excludes information on one-stop service 
in the market. The model is similar to that in Berry (1992), but applied to nonstop 
entry.   In this benchmark model there are 19 moment conditions.17    Most of the 
17 7 The instruments Zi  for the market specific error term ui  include the exogenous covariates 
of population and distance. It also includes a count of the number of potential entrants, the number 
of 
firms with the network effect variable greater than 5, the number of firms with the network variable 
greater than 10, and the sum of the squared share of nonstop services offered out of the city. The 
instruments for the firm specific error terms ui1, and ui2 include all the covariates for the individual 
firm. In addition, I also use the number of firms in the market with network variable greater than 
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results of the benchmark model follow expectations. The larger the population in 
the cities the more likely airlines are to enter because of the greater demand in 
the market. The longer the distance, the less likely they are to enter because longer 
distance flights are more often served with one-stop service. The greater the network 
effect the more likely airlines are to enter. There are two results that are surprising 
in these estimates. First, the variable on number of rival nonstop entrants in the 
market is statistically insignificant. This is unexpected given that the structural 
studies by Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) that find competition has 
high statistical significance. The second surprising result is that the market specific 
unobservable is insignificant. It is possible that this insignificance may be caused 
by including the network variable that may capture much of the market specific 
unobservable profits. 
The second specification adds to the benchmark model by incorporating each 
airlines' own one-stop entry and the circular distance of the service. In estimating 
this model I include 8 additional moment restrictions to identify the additional 
parameters.18 These estimates show that owning a one-stop service of high quality 
reduces the profits from offering nonstop service. The estimates also show that as the 
circular distance of an airline's own one-stop service increases, incremental profits 
from entering also increase. Both of these results are consistent with airlines reacting 
to cannibalization effects. The result contrasts with the benchmark model because 
it shows that competition with other nonstop services has a significant and negative 
effect on profits. These estimates imply that capturing the heterogeneity of airline 
service ownership in the market may be important for accurately capturing nonstop 
competition between airlines.  In other words, it seems that the benchmark model 
10 and the number of potential entrants as additional instruments. 
1 8 The additional market specific instruments include a dummy of whether there is at least one 
one-stop service in the market, the total number of one-stop services, and the circular distances of 
the two most direct one-stop services in the market. Airline specific moment restrictions include 
the two additional explanatory variables added to the model. 
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may suffer from omitted variable bias. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
imply that owning a high quality one stop product with an OwnCircDistik variable 
near zero is similar in magnitude to having an additional nonstop rival in the market. 
This suggests that the magnitude of the cannibalization effects are large in relative 
terms. 
The "full model" includes both an airline's own one-stop service and the one- 
stop service of rival airlines. The results of this full model are qualitatively similar 
to the results of the second probit model and the second structural model. The 
results are consistent with one's own product having cannibalization effects and the 
rival one-stop and nonstop products having a business stealing effects. 
The business stealing effects from rival one-stop entrants are slightly different 
than those of the probit model. In particular, the coefficient on the number of one- 
stop entrants variable N umOthOne -  top was significant in the probit model, but 
is insignificant in this specification. However, the coefficient still has an unexpected 
positive sign. There are a number of potential explanations for this unexpected 
sign. First, this variable may be correlated with unobserved demand factors such 
as tourism or business travel in the city pair market. A second explanation is that 
it may be caused because the model treats one-stop service as a fixed portion of 
an airlines profits, when in fact the one stop market can affect the variable profits 
of firms.  The unexpected sign could occur in the following setting:  Suppose 
that an airline offers one-stop service in a market and faces competition with other 
airlines offering one-stop service. The greater the competition in the one-stop 
service market the less profitability in that market which ultimately reduces the 
cannibalization effects from offering differentiated nonstop service. Further analysis 
is necessary to determine which factors are driving this unexpected result. 
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3.6.1   Predictions and Analysis 
This section compares the predictions made by the models estimated in this paper. 
I compare the full model to the second probit model to evaluate the importance of 
structurally modeling competition. I also compare the full model to the baseline 
structural model to check the importance of incorporating information on one-stop 
service. In this section I find that the simple probit model provides the best fit 
of the data, but for predictive purposes, the full model produces more reasonable 
results. 
Table 3.7 shows the prediction for each of the three models. The simple 
probit model seems to perform better than the other two models in terms of within 
sample prediction. In the sample I observe that the total number of airlines entering 
the market is 380. The simple probit model predicts that 371.7 airlines enter, the 
benchmark structural model predicts 355.9, and the full model predicts 358. In 
terms of mean squared error in predicting the number or the identities of airlines, 
the simple probit also performs the best, followed by the full model, and in all 
cases the benchmark structural model performs the worst. The poor performance 
of the benchmark structural model suggests that incorporating information on one- 
stop services is important. A potential reason for the predictive accuracy of the 
probit model is that in many markets in the sample competition between nonstop 
competitors is not present so the probit model should perform well 
In table 3.7 I look at 5 different types of changes in exogenous variables. An 
increase in the network variable of each potential entrant by 10, more than doubles 
the number of predicted entrants in the probit model to 824.8, but increases the 
full model to only 632.6. The reason for this high prediction in the probit model is 
that it does not account for the increased competition in the market as more airlines 
enter. 
Next I examine the effect of changing circular distance in the market.  In 
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experiment 4 I hold constant the rival services, and I increase each airlines own 
circular distance by 200 miles. In both the probit and the full model there is only a 
slight increase in the number of entering firms. In experiment 5 I hold constant each 
firms own circular distance and increase the rival circular distance by 200 miles. This 
increases the number of predicted firms entering to 434.1 in the full model, while the 
probit model predicts 558.2 airlines entering. Again, the reason for the difference in 
predictions is that the probit model does not account for competition in the market. 
In the final experiment I evaluate the total effect of cannibalization from one- 
stop services by holding constant the rival services in the market and examine the 
effect on entry if no firm owned a one-stop service (i.e. assuming that One-Stop=0 
and OwnCircDist=0). With the full model I find evidence that when cannibalization 
effects are removed the average number of one-stop services in the market increases 
to 417.2. For this last experiment it is difficult to make sense of the probit result 
predicting a decline in entry which is unexpected. Overall the results from this 
section suggest that the probit estimates are unreliable for making out-of-sample 
predictions. 
3.7 Conclusion and Proposal for Future Research 
Empirical studies of entry have largely ignored the role of product ownership in 
shaping firm entry. This paper explicitly looks at the role of product ownership 
and its affect on entry decisions in the airline industry. I find evidence that canni- 
balization of an airline's own one-stop service reduces the probability that an airline 
enters a market.  As the quality of an airline's own one-stop service is lower, the 
cannibalization effect diminishes. Competition with rival one-stop services is also 
an important determinant of nonstop entry. A rival one-stop service in the mar- 
ket has a business stealing effect on nonstop entrants. In addition, higher quality 
one-stop services have a larger business stealing effects than lower quality one-stop 
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services.   Finally, my model predicts that incremental profits from offering nonstop 
service decline as the number of nonstop rivals in the market increase. 
There are a number of potential extensions to this paper. One limitation of 
the econometric model is that it assumes that the effect of one-stop service enters 
into the fixed portion of an airlines incremental profit function. This assumption 
simplified the model by ensuring a unique equilibrium to the entry game.   This 
is a strong assumption given that competition across services may affect one-stop 
variable profits which could potentially lead to interesting strategic reactions. For 
example, the reaction of an airline offering one-stop service in a market to a rival 
entering with nonstop service may actually have two effects. One effect is that 
the additional competition from a nonstop entrant reduces the profitability for the 
airline entering with nonstop service. However, a second effect is that competition 
from the rival reduces variable profits on the one-stop route which, in turn, reduces 
the cannibalization effect.  The entry decision of an airline in this setting will 
be determined by which of these effects dominates. In future analysis it may be 
interesting to allow for the one-stop service to enter the variable profit function of the 
firm. Another important extension is to structurally identify marginal cost, fixed 
cost and demand factors affecting entry. These components of a firms profit function 




Table 3.1:  M ar k et E nt r y and E xi t R ates 
Tot . # M k t s. 
Ser ved in  
1996 # Ent er ed 
E nt r y  
Rate # Exi t ed 
Exit 
Rate  
N on hub mar k et s 293 144 49.15% 57 19.45% 
H ub Car r i er s at  t hei r  hub 601 36 5.99% 8 1.33% 
N ot es: 
Sampl e i ncl udes all  ci t y pai r  combinat i ons bet ween t he l ar gest  50 U .S. ci t i es wi t h di st ances over  300 mi l es 
Excl udes ai r l i nes t hat  st opped oper at i ng over  t hi s t i me per i od 
Tot . Nonst op i n 2000 in Non  hub mar k et s:  380 
Tot . Nonst op i n 2000 by hub car r i er  at  t hei r  hub:  629 
Tabl e 3.2: Summar y Stati stics 
# of N onst op Fr equency 
Di st ance 
(100s of 
mi l es) Pop. 
N umber  of 
One st ops 
Qual i t y One 
St op (in  
M i l es) 
0 319 13.78 1.71 5.69 17.97 
1 92 11.02 2.27 5.82 32.18 
2 52 11.40 3.16 5.62 35.19 
3 29 11.43 3.84 5.66 41.48 
4 8 8.95 4.64 3.38 130.43 
5 7 13.38 8.37 4.71 17.40 
6 1 10.35 4.60 7.00 10.00 
8 3 10.17 7.00 7.00 8.33 
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Tabl e 3.3:   Ai r li ne E nt r y and N et w or k  E ffects 
Car r i er 
# Mkts 
ent er ed 
# Mkts 
Pot ent i al 




Amer i can Air l ines 45 511 11.22 
Cont i nent al 23 511 8.09 
Del ta  44 511 13.79 
N or t hwest 0 511 4.66 
U ni t ed Ai r l i nes 37 511 9.83 
TWA 9 426 3.60 
U S Ai r ways 44 359 16.12 
Sout hwest 95 301 23.34 
Amer i ca West 20 213 6.85 
M idwest  Expr ess Air l ine 20 170 5.75 
M idway Air l ines I nc. 14 109 3.66 
Alaska  11 70 6.01 
Sun Count r y Ai r l i nes 3 70 1.47 
Amer i can Tr ans Air 5 69 3.03 
Fr ont i er  Air l ines 0 49 1.63 
Ai r t r an/Fr ont i er 0 43 2.84 
Nat i onal  Air l ines 3 9 1.67 
Spir i t  Air  L ines 4 9 3.44 
Pr o Ai r  Ser vi ces 0 9 2.00 
Jet  Blue 3 6 0.67 
L egend 0 2 0.00 






Tabl e 3.4:  One St op Ci r cular  D i st ance 
	  
	  
Quali t y 
Rank  H i gh 





















1st 24.96 6 59.91 0 610 
2nd 85.48 43.00 107.00 0 582 
3rd  145.14 80.00 157.37 0 932 
4th  203.09 161.50 172.67 1 775 
5th  297.44 252.00 226.96 4 1047 
	  
	  





Var i abl es 
	  
	  
M odel  1 
	  
	  
M odel  2 
Const ant 2.163 1.709 
	   (24.25) (10.52) 
di st ance (100's mi l es) 0.048 0.061 
	   ( 7.63) ( 7.14) 
Popul at i on 0.117 0.101 
	   (7.40) (6.19) 
One st op 0.619 0.561 
	   ( 6.58) ( 5.84) 
Own Ci r c Di st  (100s mi l es) 0.050 0.054 
	   (2.23) (2.38) 
Rival  Cir c Di st  (100s mi l es) 	   0.236 
	   	   (5.03) 
Ri val   One St op 	   1.274 
	   	   ( 5.43) 
N um Ot h One St op 	   0.156 
	   	   (4.69) 
N et wor k Effect s 0.088 0.088 
	   (26.02) (25.52) 
l og l i k el i hood 667.486 648.233 
	  
* Asy Z st at ist i cs in par ent hasis  	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Tabl e 3.6:   M ai n R esult s* 
Var iable  M odel  1 M odel  2 
Ful l 
M odel 
Const ant 2.483 2.281 1.625 
(30.80) (24.57) (5.78) 
di st ance (100's mi l es) 0.104 0.114 0.128 
(6.80) (7.66) (7.42) 
Popul at i on 0.261 0.408 0.415 
(3.41) (3.78) (3.88) 
One st op 0.694 0.647 
(4.06) (4.58) 
Own Ci r c Di st  (100s mi l es) 0.090 0.080 
(2.13) (1.93) 
Rival  Cir c Di st  (100s mi l es) 0.178 
(2.72) 
Ri val  One St op 0.829 
(2.49) 
N um Ot h One St op 0.070 
(1.55) 
N et wor k Effect s 0.107 0.102 0.103 
(18.15) (15.20) (16.71) 
N umber  nonst op r i val s 0.195 0.437 0.522 
(1.33) (3.23) (3.27) 
M ar k et  Cor r el at i on 0.077 0.050 0.010 
(.34) (0.18) (0.12) 
# Obser vat i ons 511 511 511 
Simulat i on Dr aws 12 12 12 






Tabl e 3.7: Pr edictions and Analysis  
	  
	  
Act ual  # of Ent r ant s =380 
	  
	   	  
Pr obit 
M odel 2 
	  






Pr edi ct ed # of Entrant s: 
	   	   	  







M ean Squar ed Er r or : 
	   	   	  
	  
















Ent r y I mpact  Anal ysi s: 
	   	   	  
	  


































Table 3.8: Selected & Potential Hubs 
Selected Hubs 
# Nonstop Routes 
Tot. Passengers 
Originating or Tot. # of Stopping % of Passengers 
City out of Airport Destined for Airport Passengers changing planes 
Delta Atlanta 104 4,015,240 3,986,290 49.8% 
American Airlines Dallas 92 2,604,720 2,007,650 43.5% 
TWA St.Louis 71 1,245,540 1,867,920 60.0% 
US Airways Charlotte 66 881,050 1,597,110 64.4% 
Delta Cincinnati 92 871,010 1,594,810 64.7% 
United Airlines Chicago 79 2,802,650 1,333,870 32.2% 
United Airlines Denver 62 1,882,570 1,327,200 41.3% 
Continental Houston 84 1,622,740 1,255,920 43.6% 
US Airways Pitsburgh 71 1,025,440 1,179,500 53.5% 
Northwest Airlines Detroit 80 2,040,140 1,147,380 36.0% 
America West Phoenix 42 1,263,610 1,092,680 46.4% 
Northwest Airlines Minneapolis 76 1,952,670 1,078,920 35.6% 
American Airlines Chicago 73 2,009,650 923,320 31.5% 
US Airways Philadelphia 62 1,560,850 648,910 29.4% 
Delta Dallas 45 838,950 571,820 40.5% 
Delta Salt Lake City 37 970,060 563,320 36.7% 
Northwest Airlines Memphis 46 406,510 555,560 57.7% 
Continental Cleveland 65 891,190 340,240 27.6% 
Next 18 
Airtran Atlanta 26 964,690 363,900 27.4% 
Southwest Phoenix 30 1,566,270 308,430 16.5% 
US Airways Washington DC 46 2,531,650 243,870 8.8% 
Southwest Houston 22 1,234,640 229,580 15.7% 
United Airlines San Fransisco 28 2,745,580 225,570 7.6% 
Continental New York 61 2,613,140 222,670 7.9% 
United Airlines Los Angeles 26 2,386,720 220,030 8.4% 
Midway Airlines Raleigh 20 365,320 197,270 35.1% 
United Airlines Washington DC 25 1,322,200 194,380 12.8% 
Southwest Las Vegas 35 1,987,470 179,770 8.3% 
Southwest Nashville 26 675,240 173,760 20.5% 
Southwest Washington DC 24 1,195,510 166,900 12.3% 
Southwest Dallas 12 1,240,750 166,070 11.8% 
Southwest Chicago 25 1,230,330 162,730 11.7% 
America West Las Vegas 31 968,950 148,750 13.3% 
American Trans Air Chicago 21 790,170 120,370 13.2% 
Southwest Kansas City 22 586,770 116,470 16.6% 
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